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I INTRODUCTION
World War II sharpened the focus of the United Nations on
the precarious state at which national economies had arrived in
the 30* & and, by contrast, provided the world with an example
of the kind of international teamwork possible. The latter was
particularly noticeable in the introduction of a new means of
financing much of the war: The concept of Allied payment
according to comparative sacrifice evolved as it became apparent
that numerous nations could not otherwise survive. In addition,
Allied cooperation resulted in the creation of permanent
international organizations set up for the purpose of consul-
tation and collaboration in spheres remote from military
considerations.
The world faces, broadly speaking, two extremes in
future international economic relations. It can return to and
probably intensify the restrictive practices in foreign trade
and finance which slowed down world trade in the 30* s. Or it
can, in theory at least, attempt to retrace its steps to an
era similar to that preceding World War I, when all nations
shared in a prosperity based largely on free market conditions.
Technological advance in the production of goods in
which a nation has greatest advantage may call for increasing
specialization, making available to her surpluses to exchange
for foreign commodities and services. Where this is the
most economic means of production, one might support it
without further reflection. However, certain realities must
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2be taken into account.
The world economy has undergone basic economic changes
since the period when it operated along relatively unimpeded
multilateral lines. The past four decades have seen much
shifting of economic strength among nations— the rise of the
United States, for example, from debtor to leading creditor,
accompanied by the growing prestige of the American dollar—and
the substitution of managed currencies for the gold standard.
Significant changes have occurred along political lines. An
intensification of nationalism and a wide ideological split
among countries has necessitated that they increasingly take
national security into account. This has led to a tendency
toward greater self-sufficiency in spite of some of its
uneconomic aspects.
Over the years, as countries have suffered major internal
crises, there has evolved a new social concept of the
responsibility of a government to its nationals in providing
reasonably stable political and economic conditions to
encourage full employment and increase economic security. In
business crises, governments are looked to for emergency
measures until revival sets in.
Although the world faces two extremes with respect to
international economic relations, the only plausible solution
seems to lie somewhere between the commercial and monetary
freedom of economic liberalism and a state of commercial and
monetary control reflecting the influence of governmental
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•supervision and direction. Under present conditions, some
governmental interference, whether on a national or inter-
national level, is essential. The recent war has spread such
destruction that many countries who were struggling as debtor
areas even before the war could not, unaided, finance equipment
and supplies essential for relief and reconstruction. In
addition to a legacy of unsolved pre-war economic difficulties,
these countries are now saddled with widespread devastation,
disruption of productive facilities, a shortage of labor,
exhaustion of physical and monetary resources, and inflation.
No easy or new solution to these problems exists. The
mere extension of credits would add to the present burden of
deficit countries, even if other governments or private
investors were willing to accept the risk.
For practical reasons alone, however, the prevailing
widespread economic disorder cannot be ignored. Poverty in
areas which normally figure to an important extent in foreign
trade both reduces the markets of more prosperous areas and,
through the dissatisfaction which arises from a lowered
standard of living, provides a powerful incentive on the part
of individuals to seek relief at the hands of demagogues.
The United States, with its greatly expanded productive
capacity could, as it did following World War I, again attempt
to rescue countries from economic desolation through investments
and loans. However, as the 20' s taught, this would be only a
temporary expedient, and the ultimate barrier to eventual
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collapse is an attack on the fundamental causes of dlsequilibraui.
Awareness of this prompted the leadership of the American
Government in the creation of organizations to combat on an
intergovernmental level those economic and monetary problems
having world-wide repercussions.
During the interwar period, inability of deficit countries
to overcome the transfer problem—inability to obtain necessary
foreign exchange to correct maladjustments in their balance of
international payments—constituted a major obstacle to a high
degree of world trade and resulted in widespread default. In
order to overcome this obstacle, under free market conditions,
it wa6 necessary that countries be sufficiently productive and
that their goods and services be in sufficient demand at
prices which would enable their payments to foreign countries
in the long run to balance with their foreign receipts. The
basic changes which the world economy had undergone, especially
the expansion of certain types of production, which offset the
pre-war complementary relationship among countries, and the
addition of heavy debts and reparations occasioned by the war
caused deficit countries to depreciate their currencies in
order to better their competitive position. The competitive
depreciation which followed weakened their financial position
still further. With the discontinuation of American credits
at the end of the 20 1 s and the impact of the subsequent
depression, widespread defaults were followed by internal
measures restricting commercial transactions, as countries
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made an effort to minimize imports, maximize exports and control
currency movements to prevent the outward flight of capital
which would further weaken their internal credit structure.
High tariff rates protected domestic producers in creditor and
debtor countries alike.
At the outset of World War II, all countries had inten-
sified their policies of internal restrictions and joined
trading blocs whose members were bound to each other by a
network of bilateral trading agreements and discriminations
against outsiders. An exception was the United States which,
with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934, had begun to reverse her previous policy of strong
protectionism.
An outgrowth of the determination on the part of numerous
countries to attack the causes of disorder in the world
economy accentuated by the war and to create a.n atmosphere
conducive to a high degree of international economic activity
along multilateral lines has been the establishment of two
permanent international fiscal bodies. The purposes of these
organizations, the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, are,
respectively, to make available to members a pool of foreign
exchange to settle unfavorable balances in their current
transaction account, allowing time to correct basic maladjust-
ments in their economic structure, while maintaining exchange
rate stability and promoting a gradual relaxation of exchange
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restrictions, and to provide to members productive long-term
credits under favorable terms for reconstruction and development
and for stabilization. Concurrently, steps are being taken to
set up a third world agency, whose purpose would be the
relaxation and, in some instances, abolition of restrictive
ft,
commercial practices*
The United States and other signatories to the Bretton
Woods Articles of Agreement, recognizing that peace and
prosperity cannot exist indefinitely in a world rife with
economic disorder, and that relatively free international
trade is a means of encouraging full employment, internal
prosperity and "progrese, " have embarked on an experiment to
help ensure these benefits. In order to get a better under-
standing of this program, it is necessary to review in greater
detail the events which preceded it.
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7II FINANCIAL HISTORY THROUGH WORLD WAR I
Prior to the 19th century, international trade was
limited to the exchange of a few commodities. The majority of
these were of high value, since transportation had not reached
a point where it was profitable to carry bulky, less valuable
items for long distances. The industrial revolution, which
is commonly dated at the end of the 18th century, heralded
the era of mechanized mass production, a type of production
which was not profitable unless it entailed the sale of a
volume of goods exceeding domestic demand. A search for new
markets was on. These quickly developed within Europe, in
the American and other colonies and in South America.
In the 19th century, the population of industrial
countries grew disproportionately to the domestic food supply,
strengthening the dependence of industrial areas on agricultural
producers, while population movements to less-developed areas
created a still greater demand for manufactured goods. Further
expansion in mechanized production caused greater demand for
raw materials and foodstuffs. The spiral seemed endless.
Correspondingly, there was an increase in short-term loans
and investments, put chiefly to productive purposes. These
were financed in large part by the principal creditors of the
day, England, France, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands.
Markets for products, services, and capital were ever-present,
encouraged by transportation improvements and having the result

of broadening the variety and quantity of exportable goods.
Development in the United States was mainly agricultural
at first. Farm exports served as a means of financing indus-
trial imports and large European loans for Improvement of
transportation facilities and industrialization. In the last
quarter of the 19th century, immigration was heavy and agri-
culture lost 1 t 6 importance to industrial production. The
character of the American balance of payments was changing:
by the end of the 19th century, the United States was beginning
to make substantial investments abroad. European countries
were also becoming increasingly industrialized and, with grow-
ing specialization, intensified trade took place among them.
England served as banker for a world profitably occupied with
the production and international exchange of commodities and
services.
The gold standard became the monetary system of most of
Europe, the United States, Japan, Australia, and a number of
South American countries. In these areas gold was coined in
unlimited quantities at a fixed mint price. Provision for its
free circulation and for the unlimited redemption of other
circulating media stabilized exchange rates and equalized
price levels and interest rates. The gold standard was work-
able at this time partially or superficially because the
international economic system was based on the division of
labor and free movement of goods, services, and labor, and the
complementary arrangement between different types of producers
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resulted In a fairly even dl6 tribution of gold. Passive central
banking policy and internal conditions of expansion permitted
a country with a strain on its balance of payments to export
gold and allowed the domestic economy to bear the brunt of the
deflationary effects that followed. The ensuing fall in prioes,
and higher interest rates caused by the loss of gold, tended to
favor the deficit country* s export position and attract short-
term funds, which supplied her with the necessary foreign
exchange. The credit structure of the gold-receiving country,
in turn, yielded to inflationary pressures and, as prices rose,
the country* s exports declined and its imports increased until,
with tne introduction of deflationary pressures, a new equilibrium
was established. In this manner, the external and internal
financial positions of countries were tied to each other, and
gold - serving as a balancing item in the settlement of
International acounts - was primarily an Instrument, not a
commodity, of commerce. More serious maladjustments called for
loans, which during this period were mainly for industrial
development and yielded high returns.
Although there was some protectionism throughout this
period, particularly in the United States, it did not figure
prominantly in world trade relations.
Beginning with the Introduction of its first tariff system
in 1816, the United States pursued an increasingly compre-
hensive protectionist policy for well over a century. This
was possible because she had a domestic market for most of her

10
Industrial production, and there was ample foreign demand for
agricultural surpluses. As the United States began to feel
the competition of other countries, she altered her policies
somewhat. In 1890, Congress provided for the inclusion in trade
treaties of most-favored-natlon clauses in return for equl-
y
valent concessions.
At about the same time, Europe, which had up to then pur-
sued a relatively free trade policy, through long-term treaties
with the most-favored-natlon clause, began to abandon its
liberal trade policies. This change was inspired partly by the
growing competition encountered by French and German peasants
with their high-cost, intensively cultivated, small-scale farms
from the low-cost extensive producers in the United States,
Siberia and Argentina. Protection spread to industrial
producers. Seafaring nations, however, kept their tariffs low.
Up to 1914, the fact that European tariff rates were moderate
and of long standing prevented drastic adjustments, and prices
remained fairly stable. Another stabilizing factor was the
drafting of 10-year treaties to reduce tariffs, including
most-favored-nation clauses.
To summarize, international economic relations during the
three or four decades preceding World War I were more extensive
and stable than at any previous time In history. There
developed great commercial areas surrounded by smaller countries
and colonies, forming complementary units. Gold, moving in
and out of countries, mainly as a cover for temporary deficits
1/ Encyclopedia Brltannlca , 14th Edition, Vol. 14, p. 590
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was fairly evenly distributed, and, with the help of exchange
stability, there existed a widespread network of well-controlled
foreign short-term loan and investment transactions. The
absence, in most countries, of measures severely restricting
trade permitted a flow of goods and services based on an
international division of labor, most advantageous, unddr those
conditions, to individual countries. It was an era of peace,
fairly free from political uncertainty, in which, except for
the United States, domestic issues were generally subordinate
to foreign trade policy.
1914 was a turning point in world economic history , It
marked the end of a period of international economic relations
based largely on free market conditions, carried out under
the gold standard. The termination of trade treaties by
belligerents was required by international law, and most
foreign investment ceased. In that year, most governments,
the United States an exception, went off the gold standard and
established rigid controls over gold. Allied purchases of
military supplies and essential civilian requirements from
the United Spates and neutrals were financed, first, by foreign
exchange and gold balances, then, as these dwindled, by the
liquidation • of foreign assets and the extension of credits.
As the war progressed, most countries suffered inflation.
In the United Kingdom, the wholesale commodity price index
rose from 108 in December 1914 to 313 in April 1920 and in
y
France from 107 in October 1914 to 588 in April 1920.
17 Bradford, Frederick A., Money and Banking, Longmans, Green
and Co./ New York, 194& 51
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When World War I ended In 1918, the economic situation of
most countries was in a state of chaos. The well-integrated
commercial and financial relations in existence between nations
in 1S14 were gone. The structure of creditor and debtor
countries had changed. The United States had become a leading
creditor due to a repatriation of American securities, the
purchase of foreign securities, and Government loans.
A desire for wartime self-sufficiency had led to an over-
expansion in productive capacity, particularly in the area of
agriculture. This, added to war damages and widespread
shortages, aggravated the general economic confusion.
The authors of the peace treaties failed to stress the
need for re-establishment of economic conditions enabling
multilateral trade relations to return, and territorial
changes brought about the breakdown of certain formerly comple-
mentary economic units. Newly-created states proceeded to
compete vigorously for markets and immediately introduced
protective measures.
The imposition of reparations on Germany and the Allied
1/
obligations to the United States amounting to $10 billion
called for heavy one-sided payments. A return to the gold
standard was out of the question for most nations until they
had cleared away excess money and established their currency
at a value lower than prior to or during the war.
The United States, the only strong economic power at this
time, terminated all wartime controls after the cessation of
1/ Benns, F. Lee, Europe Since 1914, F.S. Crofts & Co.. New
York, 1945

hostilities, permitting domestic prices and wages to find
their own level, and it dropped its support of the pound and
franc. With the conclusion of the peace negotiations, the
13
American Government withdrew largely from world affairs,
punctuating this policy by a refusal to become a member of the
League of Nations and the enactment of a further increase in
y
tariff rates in 1921-2. Private investors, on the other
hand, renewed their activity, supplying at first predominantly
short-term funds, followed by long-term.
)
1/ Lar# Hal B. and associates, The United States in the World
Economy, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Economic Series No. 23,”
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1943
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Ill THE INTERWAR PERIOD
In 1914, the United States was a net debtor by more than
$3 billion. By the end of 1919, she had become a net creditor
of approximately the same amount* not taking into account
1/
intergovernmental debts amounting to $10 billion. Simul-
taneously, European governments were faced with the necessity
of restoring their budgets, halting currency depreciation
and servicing their war debts.
During the 20*6, American practice with respect to
commercial policy, war debts and private foreign investment
was detrimental to a harmonious world economy. Instead of
encouraging an increase in imports to supply its debtors with
dollars to repay their obligations, the United States through
its commercial policy concentrated on an increase in its export
balance, and the subsidy of its Merchant Marine affected
adversely an important source of income for seafaring nations.
The discontinuation of American Government loans to Europe
in 1920 was followed by large private investments whose pro-
y
ceeds were frequently put to uneconomic purposes. Many
countries added unnecessarily to their transfer problem by
overborrowing.
World-wide demand for food and reconstruction material
provoked a pronounced increase in American prices, extending
from mid-1919 to mld-1920. This boom, which further impoverished
y ta lIhoSi!88t* inSmu u5f., c$g&fggtSiCSffi
f
!
2/ Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. clt., p. 138
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European buyers, led to a recession beginning in the summer of
1920 and lasting into the following year. The world-wide
decline in agricultural prices that materialized due to
excessive wartime expansion of capacity added to the burden
of debtors, increasing their transfer problem and adding to
the difficulty of currency stabilization. Most countries,
excluding the United States, underwent monetary crises, and
their currencies depreciated rapidly.
Representatives of leading countries, whose governments
were aware of the unbalance in monetary and commercial spheres,
met at conferences relating to these questions in Brussels
and Geneva in 1920 and 1922, respectively. The outcome of
their discussions was slight. The participating experts
assumed that a restoration of the pre-war monetary framework
would summon the pre-war pattern of trade and financial
activity. Accordingly, they stressed the importance of return-
ing to a gold standard at any cost, generally ignoring the
need for taking into account the changed economic conditions
which would prevent its smooth functioning.
Countries slowly returned to some sort of gold standard,
but few were able to return to the pre-war parity, and the
United States alone was in a position to re-establish it
without external aid. The United Kingdom went back to the
gold standard at the old par of $4.8665 in 1925, whereas France
stabilized the franc in 1928 at about one-fifth its pre-war
y
value
.
This relative overvaluation of the pound, as well as
1/ Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. cit., p. 164

»I
of various satellite currencies, and undervaluation of the
franc had a weakening effect on the world economy of the
20* s. The United Kingdom was forced to depend excessively on
foreign short-term capital for balancing its international
accounts, while the strength of the French balance of payments
position brought about the accumulation in other countries of
large French balances, subject to sudden withdrawal.
By 1928, most countries were on the gold standard again;
however, it differed from the pre-war standard. Few countries
coined gold, and most of them depended on private American
loans and investment for support. In some areas, the gold
exchange standard was introduced. Countries on this type of
standard used as their gold reserves balances held for them
by financially more stable gold standard countries. Although
some gold standard countries “sterilized" such gold reserves,
frequently, the latter served as a base for credit expansion in
both countries. This prevented the corrective effects of
capital movements that had formerly existed under the gold
standard and accentuated the maldistribution of gold.
Early in the 1920* s the question of stabilizing the German
economy became significant for the United States, as well as
for the countries to which Germany owed reparations. The latter,
based on estimated war damage, were placed at $33 billion in
y
1921, excluding the Belgian war debt. The United States,
although she had made no request for reparations, was indirectly
affected by the state of the German economy, as it became clear
17 Benns, F. Lee, op. cit., p. 162
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that Germany needed support if she were to keep up her repara-
tions payments and, in turn, enable her creditors to pay their
war debts to the United States. In 1924, with the acceptance
of the Dawes Flan, German currency was stabilized through a
foreign loan of $200 million, over half of it provided by
y
private American investors. During the time that this plan
was in force, reparations payments and, in turn, payments on
war debts to the United States were regular. By 1928, however,
it wa6 obvious that the total of $53 billion worth of repara-
tions was too great a hardship on the German economy in its
existing state of economic instability, and, after lengthy
deliberations, the Young Flan was signed in 1930. It revised
downward the total of reparations to $9 billion (based on the
balance of war debts owed the United States) and created the
Bank for International Settlements. The chief purpose of this
Bank, managed by representatives of the central banks of the
countries involved in the reparations settlement, including
Germany, was to perform the banking functions necessary between
the time it received the German annuities and the time they
were distributed.
After World War I, the central banking policy of most
countries was stronger than it had been in the early 1900* s and
included certain gold reserve requirements against deposits
and higher minimum requirements against notes in circulation.
Open-market operations, constituting a principal instrument in
17 Benns, F. Lee, op. cit., p. 168
2/ Ibid., p.171
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credit control, led to the accumulation of gold without foster-
ing conditions for an outflow of funds. Consequently, the
influence of gold on currency and credit changed. When a
country was short of gold, it went off the gold standard and
depreciated its currency, or imposed foreign exchange restric-
tions .
At first, equilibrium in balance of payments was maintained
by foreign countries primarily by credits, both short- and
long-term, from private investors in the United States. From
1919 to 1930, such long-term credits amounted to an annual
*
y
average of nearly $1 billion. Although such funds could have
strengthened debtor economies to meet external obligations,
through productive reconstruction and economic development,
investors neglected to question too closely or to supervise
the uses to which these funds were put. An exception was the
flow of dollars going into direct investments, where American
citizens owned, or had a major interest in, foreign enterprise.
From 1919 to 1929, an estimated $3.5 billion went abroad into
y
this form of Investment.
As the 30 1 8 approached, a slackening and, finally in 1930,
a near cessation of foreign loans brought to an end this era
3/
of precarious financing. The reversal was based mainly on an
increase in interest rates of domestic bonds and 11 the appearance
4/
of a speculative boom in (American) equity securities,..."
1/ Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. cit., p. 89
2/ Ibid., p. 100
3/ Ibid., Table II
4/ Ibid., p. 98
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The depression, perhaps more severe in the United States
than elsewhere, "brought about the greatest unemployment in that
country's history. American industry almost reached a stalemate.
In an attempt to reduce still further competition from foreign
producers and to bolster its employment, the American Congress
enacted in 1930 the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, a law broadening
the tariff structure and raising duties to the highest level
in history,
A monetary crisis in Austria in 1931 in which the govern-
ment had to come to the rescue of the country's largest private
bank added to an existing general lack of confidence in the
solvency of Central Europe, Bankruptcy also threatened in
Germany, where American bankers were withdrawing their short-
term funds. To offset further financial difficulties, the
Hoover Moratorium was introduced, suspending payments on
1/
reparations and war debts for a year, commencing July 1931
Shortly thereafter, the financial situation in Germany worsened
with the continued recall of short-term funds to the United
Kingdom, as well as the flight of capital held by nationals.
The German Government was finally forced to close all banks
temporarily. This led Germany's creditors to negotiate with her
in August 1931 a "standstill agreement," extending their short-
y
term credits to it until February 1932. There next ensued a
flight of Dutch, Belgian and Swiss gold holdings from London,
Inspired by the fear that the "standstill agreement" would make
1/ Benns”ir7"Lee, 0p. cit., p. 174
£/ Ibid., p. 175
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the United Kingdom insolvent and she would go off the gold
standard. Continued withdrawals forced her off in September
1931. This step was followed shortly by many other countries,
both in Europe and elsewhere. Finally, many European countries
were forced to default on their debts. In 1932, Germany ended
her reparations payments, and, two years later, all nations
except Finland had discontinued payments on their American
war debts.
With the cessation of capital exports from the United States
and the advent of the depression, foreigners were hard pressed
to overcome the transfer problem and gradually a trend that
had been developing since World War I clearly established
itself: the correction of maladjustments in balance of payments
by government interference, through the adoption of managed
currencies and the Imposition of discriminatory commercial
and monetary practices.
The United States followed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act with
another measure further impeding the flow of dollars abroad.
This was the Johnson Act of 1934, which outlawed loans by
American nationals to foreign governments in default on their
debt obligations to the United States Government.
Especially significant in this period of intensified
protectionism was the renunciation of free trade by its last
major exponent, the United Kingdom. The Ottawa agreements of
1932 provided for mutual preferential rates between Great
Britain and all the Dominions but the Iri3h Free State and
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between Great Britain and India and Southern Rhodesia. In the
same year, the United Kingdom set up an Equalization Account
to stabilize the exchange value of the pound in the international
monetary market.
Four Western European countries, France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Switzerland, remained on the gold standard for
a time, although this entailed an overvaluation of their
currencies in terms of others and worked a hardship on their
economies
.
The new era in international economic relations was not
heralded with enthusiasm, and another united attempt to
straighten out world economic disorder was made when the World
Monetary and Economic Conference, in which leading countries
were represented, convened in London in 1933. Again, the
experts were unwilling to attack basic causes, and the failure
of the conference became conclusive when the American Govern-
ment officially declared that its international economic
policy must henceforth necessarily be subordinate to internal
affairs. Soon, thereafter, the United States depreciated its
currency for domestic reasons, and the country went off the
gold standard to prevent domestic hoarding of gold and its
flight from the country. The devaluation of the dollar in
1934 increased by $2.8 billion the dollar value of gold held
y
by the Treasury. With $2 billion of this, the United States
Government established a Stabilization Fund to steady the
exchange value of the dollar in the international money market.
l7 Encyclopedia Brltannlca
,
14th Edition, 1939, Vol. 22, p.742
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A6 the 30' s progressed, an almost universal rise in Import
duties was supplemented by restrictive measures which "entailed
minute supervision and licensing of trade transactions, either
through the medium of exchange control or import quotas or
1/
various combinations of both." These restrictions led to
preferential tariff systems and special bilateral trading
arrangements. By 1938, almost all European countries had
established numerous bilateral clearing agreements, which
provided that a country paid for its imports only as it exported
to the other country who was party to the arrangement. In order
to settle its accounts with its exporters, a country might be
forced to take whatever products the other offered it.
Germany gradually created a network of restrictions which
developed into economic warfare. All foreign exchange was
subject to Government control, and a system of multiple currency
was Introduced. This entailed the use of a variety of Relch-
marks representing different values, with each type employed
for specific purposes. In the decade preceding the war,
Germany began a penetration into the economy of the Balkans.
Their economies, predominantly agrarian, were particularly
depressed due to the world-wide collapse of agricultural prices
and their elimination from former markets by prohibitive
tariffs. Germany moved to exchange her products for their raw
materials and foodstuffs through bilateral clearing agreements
until, eventually, as this arrangement continued, the Balkan
economy was supported mainly by the assurance of the German
Tf Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. cit., p. 63
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market. Germany consistently held a net Import balance In this
area and pressed on her creditors whatever types of surpluses
she desired. It was a form of "dumping," In addition, the
^ Balkans felt Impelled to tolerate German intervention in other
spheres of their affairs.
The activity of American industry in the second half of the
30' s rallied somewhat, due to recovery from the depression and
a governmental policy based on deficit spending to increase
employment and raise prices. In 1935, American industrial
physical production was 21$ lower than in 1929; by 1937, it
exceeded the 1929 level by almost 3$. National income, however,
remained below the 1929 level of $83 billion, having fallen to
33$ less than the 1929 level in 1935 and recovered only to 14$
y
less in 1937. An inflationary policy was also adopted for the
domestic agricultural population, adversely affected by low
world farm prices, through the passage in 1933 of the Agri-
cutural Adjustment Act. This Act, designed to raise farm prices,
provided for special compensation to farmers who restricted
acreage under cultivation. None of these policies offered
more than a temporary solution to domestic problems. Industrial
prices remained below the 1929 level, and industrial output was
absorbed by a public works program introduced as a temporary
relief measure. The farm program was equally unrewarding.
) American farmers substituted intensive for extensive cultivation
as a means of benefiting from Government subsidies. This pre-
vented a subs tantial reduction in total output.
T7 Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. cit., Table 16, p. 184
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The American Government also took measures in the field of
foreign finance and trade to increase its exports. In 1934, it
created the Export-Import Bank of Washington, giving it
unlimited authority to extend credits to he utilized for the
y
partial financing of American exports. From 1934 to 1939,
the Bank made such loans, available to countries not affected
y
by the Johnson Act, to the extent of approximately $100 million.
In 1934, the Government partly reversed its foreign commercial
policy with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
Earlier legislation had provided for most-favored-natlon
treatment under exacting conditions of reciprocity. This Act
provided for mutual liberalization of commercial practices
and
between the United States/any country that might care to enter
into such an agreement and, if granted equivalent concessions,
the Executive Branch was authorized to reduce tariffs by as
much as 50$>.
By the middle 30' s, the world economy consisted of a
number of blocs, made up of countries whose currencies were
tied to, or whose economies were dependent on, the dominant
economic power within the bloc. The sterling bloc, for example,
was dominated by the British pound; the economy of the Balkans
hinged on Germany; South America was strongly Influenced by both
the United States and Germany. Finally, the gold bloc, composed
17 In 1939, the Act of 1935, which extended the life of the
Bank, was amended to provide tnat "loans outstanding at any
one time should not exceed $100,000,000." In the 40*6, the
Bank's lending authority was revised upward.
2/ Source: telephone conversation with member of Research Div.
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
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of Western European countries was under the leadership of France.
Until 1934, there continued to be a net outward flow of
dollars from the United States (accounted for by short-term
funds, since the net flow of long-term capital was inward).
After 1934, however, there was a heavy net inflow of both
short- and long-term capital, mainly from Europe into the
y
United States. A universal desire for liquidity, and banking
crises in the United States and elsewhere were the chief
elements prompting the outward flow in the early 30*6. Repatria-
tion and redemption of dollar bonds and flight of money from
abroad accounted mainly for the inward flow after 1934. From
the 30* s on, the emergence of new factors in international
political and economic affairs influenced and finally dominated
capital movements. Among these were the inability to overcome
the transfer problem, fear of depreciation, growing nationalism,
and political uneasiness resulting from the threat of German
aggression,
Belgium abandoned the gold standard in 1935, the first move
in the dissolution of the gold bloc. In 1936, fear that France
planned to depreciate the value of the franc caused the with-
drawal of enough funds from its central bank to force her to
follow Belgium* s example. The Netherlands and Switzerland also
abandoned the gold standard in the same year.
After 1934, silver was a substantial item in the American
balance of payments. This was due mainly to the American silver
purchase program, authorized by the Silver Purchase Act of 1934,
y Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. cit., p. 89
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which Instructed the United States Treasury to purchase silver
until the value of silver reserves was equal to one-third those
of gold. From 1534-S, silver imports into the United States
amounted to a total of more than $1 billion, whereas exports
1/
were negligible. Much of the Inward flow came from foreign
reserves and silver in circulation. Especially affected were
the reserves of China, the major nation on the silver stand-
ard. The outflow of silver which ensued had a deflationary
effect on her economy and eventually forced her off to a
paper-currency standard in 1934 and 1935.
The contingency of a war was reflected in an intensification
of protective trade and exchange measures among European
nations and an accentuation of the flight of funds into the
United States for safekeeping. Central banking procedures
throughout the decade had been closely tied to governmental
policy, which Increasingly subordinated foreign to domestic
affairs. This was especially true as the 30 1 s drew to a close
and many countries became intent on making their economies
increasingly self-sufficient, with a larger proportion of
their budgetary expenditures earmarked for strengthening their
war machinery.
1/ Lary, Hal B. and associates, op. cit., p. 86
ut
- (
<
f f
•
,
•
.
'
.
- .
<
c
c .
‘
;>
y
-
f 1
' ' p
1
r
c $ ( ( ;
•>r .
' t
f
,
a
'
r
"
1
'
r
r r
t *
r
r
<
*
«
.
.
«
IV WORLD WAR II AND POST-WAR PROBLEMS
World War II brought an abrupt end to the form of trade
and finance that had developed in the interwar period. A large
proportion of the commerce became one-sided, as countries at
war increased their stocks of foodstuffs, machinery and war
materiel. Official exchange rates were set up, and movements
of gold, merchandise and capital were controlled by licensing.
Countries differed in their tactics for financing foreign
purchases. Germany intensified her pre-war economic and
political penetration. As she gained control over increasing
territory, her wartime budget was financed to a considerable
extent by dictating and utilizing much of the production of
Occupied areas and imposing on them excessive charges, including
the costs of occupation. Through the confiscation of private
property both within Germany and in Occupied countries, the
German Government acquired controlling interests in industrial
enterprises. Iron and steel works and related induetH.es were
absorbed by the Reichswerke Hermann Goerlng, which, by D-Day,
formed an extensive network over Europe, and other major or
foreign
strategic/companies were attached to large German concerns.
At the beginning of the war, the United Kingdom paid for
its net imports with part of its reserves of gold and foreign
exchange, with proceeds from the sale of foreign investments,
and through credits, principally in the form of sterling
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balances. In exchange for goods and services, foreign and
Empire countries had by the end of 1944 accumulated approximately
2/
$7.6 billion worth of sterling balances.
During the war, the sterling bloc formed a dollar pool.
Under this arrangement, all dollars coming into the possession
of any member of the bloc were sold to the British Government,
which determined their expenditure, based on an endeavor to
maximize their efficiency in use.
Early in the war, it became clear to American officials that
certain nations fighting on the side to which their Government
was sympathetic were in desperate need of financial aid, and
it was necessary that some means be devised to circumvent the
Johnson Act so that they might continue to receive those imports
essential to the prosecution of the war. Aware that much of
the expenditure of war was for unproductive goods and believing
that those countries fighting against the Axis were being of
indirect service to the United States, the American Government
enacted the Lend-Lease Act in 1941, which was based on the
principle of comparative sacrifice, or on the theory that the
size and resources of a country should be the principal
determinants of its contribution to financing the war. No
reference was made to payment in goods or money. The Act was
implemented by mutual Aid agreements between the United States
and other countries in which each of the two parties agreed <jaf ter
T7 Out of a total of Approximately $18 billion worth of foreign
investments, about one-quarter had been liquidated by the
end of 1944. Lewis, Cleona, op, cit., p. 20
2/ Ibid., p. 21.
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the United States became a belligerent) to supply each other
with the goods and services necessary to the waging of war.
From March 1941 to July 1S46, the United States Congress
appropriated a net of $43 billion for Lend-Lease goods and
services, of which $2 billion were allocated after V-J Day.
Most of this aid ($31 billion worth) went to the British
1/
Empire and $11 billion worth to the U.S.S.R. The American
Government raised its own funds through taxation and the sale
of bonds to private individuals and to commercial bank6„
During the war, the large volume of trade was carried on
mainly without being balanced between countries and without
causing pressure on currencies. This was due to the effect of
governmental control of exchange rates and Lend-Lease. In
addition to Lend-Lease and loans, the United States Government
paid for the expansion of the production of strategic products
in friendly countries and engaged in a preclusive purchasing
program to prevent strategic goods from coming into enemy
possession.
As the war continued, some of the Allies took steps to
carry over into peacetime their wartime cooperation in certain
spheres. This move was based on a recognition of tie fact that
to the maladjustments of the past two decades would be added
the legacy of the current war—impairment of productive facili-
ties, a reduction in monetary reserves, additional debts,
inflationary pressures, widespread shortages, and destruction—
l/ The World Almanac , 1947 edition, New York World-Telegram,
New York, 1947, p. 516
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leading to a general disruption in foreign trade and finance.
Accordingly, a number of international conferences were held
to discuss mutual problems end 6et up permanent organizations.
Of particular interest in this connection wac the United
Nations M0netary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods,
N. H., in July 1944, which will be covered in some detail in
the next chapter.
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V THE BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE
During the interwar period, it became increasingly apparent
that the stagnating effect in international economic relations
was caused not only by basic changes but to an Important extent
by a superstructure of exchange and commercial restrictions
imposed on domestic economies. Large-scale public works
programs served as artificial expedients and the threatened
war situation was a temporary factor in the activation of
productive capacity.
The war added to the maladjustments evident in the years
preceding it. Most countries were faced after the war with
inflation, budgetary deficits, and an excess of demand over
supply - an outcome of a combination of normal requirements,
war damage, scarcity or absence of raw materials, inadequate
manpower and lower productivity. UNRRA shipments, which
began late in 1944, filled a small part of the needs of wartorn
areas, but the United States was the main potential source.
Moreover, dollar and gold reserves of foreign countries were
low, with few exceptions.
The United States nad become the world's largest creditor.
Although shortages and destruction elsewhere carried over into
the Immediate post-war period an active demand for its output,
it was necessary that markets be maintained beyond the transitional
period to make use of her productive facilities, which had under-
gone substantial wartime expansion, in order to avoid internal
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deflationary pressures. From the time that she became a leading
industrial power, the imports of the United States had consisted
predominently of raw materials and her exports of manufactures
and semi-manufactures. Continued demand for the latter required
a high national income on the part of foreign countries and
the ability to accumulate the necessary foreign exchange. The
future level of American exports would depend on a number of
factors: the success of the Marshall Plan, which offers aid
to interested European countries after they have drawn up a
practical blueprint to clear up their economic disorder; the
pattern of trade relations established by countries not partici-
pating in this plan; the foreign commercial policy of the
United States; the degree of success and the significance of
international bodies established to bring about conditions
favoring multilateral trade and clearing; the extent and
Influence of private and Government loans; the pressure for a
higher standard of living and the pressure of a larger population
in the United States; the character of cyclical movements; and
the extent to which military considerations throughout the
world obscure economic issues.
The United Kingdom, historically the world T s banking center
and its most important trader, had by the end of the war
become a debtor. Two of her traditional sources of revenue to
pay for her enormous excess of imports - shipping receipts and
income from investments - had been reduced by the war. Much
of her merchant marine had been destroyed and a large proportion
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of her foreign Investments liquidated to help finance the war.
She was handicapped in her third principal means of raising
foreign exchange, exportation, through a shortage of raw
materials and labor, by an overwhelming need for her own
production and by a weakened competitive position in world mar-
kets due to a need for modernization.
Despite the aid extended through Lend-Lease, the United
Kingdom increased substantially its indebtedness during the
war, and its reserves of gold and foreign exchange were 6harply
reduced. Its territory both at home and abroad suffered
damages from the enemy. In 1946, the United States negotiated
a British loan of $4.4 billion in exchange for certain pledges
affecting British commercial policy. The British Government
agreed specifically to the dissolution of its restrictive
exchange arrangements with the sterling area, the gradual
unfreezing of accumulated sterling balances for convertibility
into any currency, and a general relaxation of trade restrictions
The direction of post-war Russian economic policy was not
clear. The pre-war state of uneasiness in European politics
followed by the hostilities interrupted a trend toward greater
production in her consumer goods industries. After the war,
a preoccupation with further development of Russian productive
resources plus repair of war destruction required the contin-
uation of a heavy outlay in capital goods. The role that the
U.S.S.R. would play in international economic relations v;as
not discernible. Prior to the war, her state trading monopoly
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had entered Russian exports into the world market only to the
extent that it was necessary to supplement gold production in
payment for her imports. In the past two years, however, the
U.S.S.R. has entered Into important bilateral trade agreements
with Scandinavian and Eastern European countries and, up to the
present, has chosen not to become a member of international
agencies fostering the creation of machinery favorable to
free trade.
The economic future of Germany and Japan, prominent pre-war
industrial nations, had not been mapped out by the United
Nations. The desirability of restoring their great Industrial
capacity was offset by political considerations to prevent
their renascence as military powers. However, the restoration
of a “normal" level of activity in either country would have to
be preceded by a period of stabilization, supported by outside
aid.
China urgently required extensive immediate relief and,
in the long run, internal economic development to raise the
standard of living of her population. The latter was true of
other unindustrialized parts of the world. South America
needed development, and certain of its countries had built up
substantial dollar balances during the war in exchange for
exports to this country. However, the political instability
which persisted on that continent would probably serve as a
partial obstacle in encouraging the necessary foreign investment.
The war had worsened the position of most countries suffering

35
a deficit in their balance of payments before the war. To the
existence of a precarious financial position based on an uncertain
market for their foodstuffs and raw materials was added war
destruction, loss of manpower, lack of foreign exchange, and
inflation. Exceptions were certain members of the sterling
bloc, through the accumulation of sterling in exchange for their
exports to the United Kingdom. Some of these, notably India and
Falestine, shifted from debtor to creditor status in the period
from 1938 to 1S44.
During the war, there was much speculation within and among
countries with respect to the type of framework necessary to
restore extensive international trade relations on a sound
basis to encourage full peacetime employment and a higher
national income, leading to the stabilization of domestic
economies at a high level of activity. Two major countries
especially concerned with thi6 question were the United States
and the United Kingdom. They believed that the interwar
approach by countries of meeting their economic difficulties
single-handed would prove as futile and disastrous after the
war as before, and they were desirous of taking advantage of
the spirit of international teamwork that had developed during
the war. Accordingly, in each of these countries there arose
almost simultaneously a blueprint devising means to re-establish
a system of multilateral transactions in commerce and finance,
taking into account the changes which had transpired in the
Interval since the existence of such a system.
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These plans consisted of drafts for an International
Clearing Union and for an International Stabilization Fund,
fathered, respectively, by the late Lord Keynes, the foremost
economist in the United Kingdom at the time, and Harry D. White
of the U.S. Treasury. Dating back to 1943, when these plans
appeared, discussions took place in both countries and gradually
included officials of other nations, until they culminated
in 1944 in the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference
at Bretton Woods. It was at this conference that a program was
devised by representatives of the 44 countries present to pro-
vide a financial structure favorable to the revival of
y
relatively free trade among nations.
To accomplish this end, plans were made for the establishment
of two world agencies, the International Monetary Fund and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The
functions of these were to be, respectively, 1) to establish
a pool of foreign exchange to permit members to settle temporary
maladjustments on current account in their balance of payments,
the stabilization of their currencies, a gradual relaxation of
exchange restrictions, and 2) to make available to needy
countries long-term credits for economic reconstruction and
development and for stabilization. The documents drafting the
Fund and Bank and enumerating their functions and powers were
entitled Articles of Agreement (see Appendix I for those out-
lining the Fund), and provisions were made for amending them.
At the same conference, it was decided that the Bank for
y In addition, Denmark sent an unofficial observer to the
conference.
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International Settlements be liquidated as rapidly as feasible;
that a strong effort be made to uncover enemy assets unjustly
gained, before there was opportunity to convert them into less
identifiable forms, and return them to their rightful owners;
that the assembled countries would promote other measures, out-
side the scope of the agencies outlined by the conference,
conducive to peaceful world trade,,
Until December 31, 1946, any of the countries represented
at the Bretton Woods conference was eligible for membership in
the Fund upon ratification by its legislature of the Articles
of Agreement. Eligibility for membership in the Bank depended
upon prior membership in the Fund, in addition to ratification
of the Articles of Agreement drafting the Bank. Up to the
present, forty of these so-called Schedule A countries have
become members of both organizations, with Russia, Australia,
Haiti and Liberia abstaining. In order to join, these must now
make application for membership. Non-Schedule A countries may
also apply for admission. Of the latter, Italy, Syria, and
Turkey have become members, bringing the present membership of
each organization up to 43. It is understood that the accept-
ance of membership by a government is in behalf of itself, as
well as any territory in its possession or over whicn it has
control
.
The Articles of Agreement took on lawful existence December 27,
1945. However, the Bank did not begin operations until June
1946 and it was followed nine months later by the Fund. The
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main office of each agency must be located In the country with
the largest quota, and has been situated in Washington, D.C.
There prevailed strong sentiment in the United States for a
return to some form of the gold standard, due to the prosperous
conditions in existence during the pre-World War I period when
it was in operation. During the interwar period a strong fear
of commercial banking procedure developed because the power to
create money under it might lead to excess creation, bringing
with it the dangers of inflation. This argument led to the
1/
endorsement of the "impersonal restraints" of the gold standard.
History proved, however, that the gold standard worked smoothly
only as long aw it encountered no abnormal economic strains.
The changes evident after World War I and the crisis in the 30’
s
pointed up the inability of the gold standard to withstand
adversity without support. A continuation into the period
following World War II of basic changes in individual economies
of countries important in world trade, leading to still lees
complementary International economic relations, removed the
world still farther from a set of conditions under which the
gold standard might successfully operate.
In the United Kingdom, opposition to the gold standard, was
6trong because of the depressive nature of the domestic economy
from the time it returned to the gold standard in 1925 at the
old pre-war parity until the subsequent depreciation of the
pound in 1931.
17 Anon.
,
lEe World Bank Proposals, Fortune
. 1943, XXVIII, 26,
p. 172
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The Keynes and Treasury plans had essentially the same
objective— the creation of permanent international machinery
to encourage the establishment of world conditions suitable to
a heavy network of multilateral trade and clearing in order to
ensure a higher degree of prosperity within countries, character-
ized by full employment and higher national incomes. There was
some variation in the plans with respect to execution.
The International Clearing Union (the Keynes plan) was based
on the overdraft principle, with no capital of its own. Each
member country was assigned a quota fixed in terms of gold for
the purpose of settling international balances. These credits
moved only within the system, so that an increase in debits on
the account of a central bank due to settlement of an unfavorable
balance automatically produced a credit balance on the books of
another central bank. No stipulation was made as to the size
of quotas. These were to be based mainly the value of a country’s
trade and were subject to periodic revision.
The Treasury’s International Stabilization Fund possessed
capital amounting to |5 billion, made up of quotas of gold and
domestic currencies, subscribed by member countries. Purchases
from and sales to the Fund of currency would make available,
under adequate safeguards, necessary foreign exchange to
members, in settlement of unfavorable balances on current
account and maintain the liquidity of the Fund’s resources.
Purchases of member currencies in exchange for domestic currency
were limited bv » country’s auota. The institution in each plan
r ' ‘ iff
!
. 'Vi r
.
r
:
'
(
, r
,
1 r -
> Of
> )
•
'
>
.
"
, ) •:
* C
i
'
4
r
r
i < • :
rir
r
r
' ) C -i .
'
<
.
1
r
"
.
r ">
. r v\ ' l ' J.
r
f
,
c
..
i • V f
rr
-> ' <
1
5
1
!
‘
. j -
') r: ; :
I
t
)
"
v
<
’
.
} o* •'
1
i.
‘
- 1
-
' v n
) f
" ’
. :J 'j • - .•->! . it
no
'
r T '
'
, n' r
- 1
* O
f
served to supplement existing facilities in the international
monetary market.
Each plan emphasized exchange stabilization as a function of
its institution, but provision was made for orderly changes in
exchange rates where needed. Exchange rates were defined in
terms of a new international unit of account ( the "bancor" in the
Keynes plan and the "unitas" in the Treasury plan), and these,
in turn, were fixed in terms of gold.
The Keynes plan provided for recommendations and penalties
for countries building up and maintaining excessive balances of
either debits or credits; the Treasury plan provided for penalties
against excessive or continued debits and recommendations for
use of excessive credit balances. Recommendations and, in the
Keynes plan, help were provided to correct underlying causes of
currency instability. The Keynes plan recommended that another
international institution supply long-term credits.
Although suggestions from each of the above plans were
Incorporated into the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, the
latter were based mainly on the Treasury plan. The Fund was to
be a permanent institution with a capital of .$10 billion (if its
membership were composed of all the countries of the world),
consisting of the quotas subscribed by member countries and paid
in gold and domestic currency. The introduction of a new unit
of international account was abandoned, and gold continued to
serve in this capacity and to maintain the liquidity of the
Fund*s resources.

Although the Fund retained the commercial banking procedure,
on which the gold standard was based, it provided for certain
adjustments so that the new system would be capable of weather-
ing economic crises. Consequently, it differed from the gold
standard in the following significant respects:
1) The Fund put at the disposal of members its reserves of
foreign exchange, regardless of the distribution of gold,
2) The Fund could induce members to take appropriate measures
if they departed from equilibrium.
3) The Fund provided for orderly changes in exchange rates.
4) The Fund had the right to permit the introduction or
continuation of exchange restrictions under certain
condi tlons.
The Fund diverged markedly from the Keynes plan in one respect.
of
The Fund could sell only its reserves/foreign exchange and gold
contributed by its members and what it was able to buy or
borrow, which enabled surplus countries to know approximately
what amount of their currency would be available to other
countries. Although the Keynes plan provided that members were
limited in the use of their overdraft privileges by their
quotas, creditors had no means of determining against what
countries purchases would be made, and it was conceivable that
one or a few creditors would suffer severe inflation as a
result of high credit balances. This fearlessness toward
inflation demonstrated by Lord Keynes was explained in part by
consternation over the domestic consequences of deflationary
pressures and an assumption that wages had a natural tendency
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~ V
"to rise beyond the limits set by the volume of money." Wage
rises brought about price rises. If the latter were checked,
marginal producers were squeezed out of production by increasing
costs, creating unemployment. Domestic prices should, therefore,
not be subject to outside dictation.
Recognition of the interdependence of the Fund and Bank was
emphasized by the condition that an applicant for membership
to the Eank must be a member of the Fund. An object of this
regulation was an attempt to decrease defaults on Bank loans
through the intrusion of the transfer problem.
The creators of the Articles of Agreement emphasized the
need for concerted action in the field of commercial policy
leading to a relaxation of trade restrictions as a necessary
counterpart of the Bretton Woods attack on international mone-
tary relations.
The Congress of the United States made that country a member
of the Fund and Bank when it approved HR 3514 in July 1945. In
the same Act, it provided for a National Advisory Council on
Monetary and Financial Affairs, whose purpose was "to coordinate
the policies and operations of the representatives of the
United States on the Fund and Bank and of all agencies of the
Government which make or participate in making foreign loans
or which engage in foreign financial, exchange or monetary
transactions-—" The Council was instructed to keep the
Executive Branch of the Government fully informed on all
1/Halm, Ge orge N
. ,
International Monetary Cooperation
,
The University
of North Carolina Fress, North Carolina, 1945, p. 105
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activities under its jurisdiction, through conferences and the
submission of reports. The Act also emphasized the Government 1 s
desire to participate with other governments in the reduction
of practices restrictive to foreign trade and not covered by the
Articles of Agreement.

VI THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The Fund lias been referred to as a "Banker of Central
1/
Banks." With the establishment of the Fund, there now exists
the following setup: individuals and firms have deposits in
domestic commercial banks; commercial banks have reserve
balances in central banks; and central banks maintain part of
their balances of foreign money with the Fund. The formation
by members of the Fund of a pool of foreign exchange and gold
gives members "time to correct maladjustments in their balances
of payments without resorting to measures destructive of
y
national and international prosperity." Unlike a central
bank, the Fund does not have the power to create money;
however, it can make more available, by borrowing the currency
of a member, with the latter's permission or through the
purchase of a currency in exchange for the Fund' s gold. In
this manner, the quantity of foreign exchange could theoretically
be brought under control within limits, as central banking
does. The effectiveness of the Fund in this respect is
determined by the importance in world trade of the countries
composing its membership and the willingness of members to
cooperate by agreeing to loans of their currency.
A primary purpose of the Fund is the minimization of the
duration and degree of disequilibrium in the international
balance of payments of its members. As a permanent institution,
1/ Halm, George N., op. cit., p. 51
2/ Ibid., p. 55
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it proposes to accomplish this by providing machinery for
consultation and concerted action on international monetary
problems, by the promotion of exchange stability, gradual
elimination cf foreign exchange restrictions, and by making
available to members its reserves, under adequate safeguards,
and to eliminate or postpone the need for unilateral action
which might prove disadvantageous to both the member involved,
as well as other members. By these means, the Fund seeks to
"facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade, and to contribute ... to the promotion and maintenance
of high levels of employment and real income and to the develop
1/
ment of the productive resources" of its members.
To implement its policy, the Fund has at hand, more specifi-
cally, the following:
1) its working capital made up chiefly of the quotas of
foreign exchange and gold subscribed by its membership. Quotas
2/
at present amount to a total of $7.7 billion. The American
quota of $2.75 billion is the largest, amounting to 36$ of the
total. The United Kingd.om has the second largest with $1.3
billion.
The gold value of the Fund* s assets must be maintained, in
¥7 Articles of Agreement of the Fund, I(ii)
2J The Articles of Agreement do not indicate the formula used
to arrive at individual quotas. The White plan stated in
this connection that due weight be given "a country 1 s hold-
ings of gold and free foreign exchange, the magnitude and
the fluctuations of its balance of international payments,
its national income, and other relevant factors." The
Keynes plan stressed the importance of the value of a
country’s foreign trade.
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spite of changes In the par value of any member’s currency.
Each member must pay its quota in full on or before the date
it is eligible to buy currencies from the Fund. Fart of the
quota must be paid in gold—either 25$ of the quota or 10$
of the member’s net holdings of gold and American dollars,
whichever is smaller—and the balance is paid in domestic
currency. Quantitative limits, both annual and total, are
placed on the use by individual members of the Fund’s reserves.
2) its voice in the maintenance of exchange stability.
Members of the Fund undertake "to collaborate with the Fund to
promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements with other members, and to avoid competitive
exchange alterations." The par value of member currencies is
fixed in terms of gold or of the U.S. dollar of the weight and
2/
fineness in effect on July 1, 1944. All purchases of gold and
foreign exchange by members must be based on par values. The
par value of currencies may be altered only where necessary to
correct a fundamental disequilibrium. Such a change, where it
exceeds 10$ of the initial par velue, must be authorized by the
Fund.
3) its control over the use of its resources. The Fund’s
resources may not be used to meet a "large or sustained outflow
of capital" unless it is "of reasonable amount required for the
T/ Articles of Agreement of the Fund, IV 4a
"if On^December 18, 1946, the Fund announced the par value of
the currencies of a majority of its members. Certain
countries took advantage of the regulation permitting them
to postpone presentation of this information, on the grounds
of inadequate recovery from the effects of war.
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expansion of exports or in the ordinary course of business."
The use to which a member puts its own supply of foreign exchange
and gold must be in accordance with the purposes of the Fund,
Members may regulate international capital movements to the
extent that they do not interfere with payments for current
transactions
.
4) the right to declare a currency scarce. A member
currency may become scarce if demand exceeds the Fund* s ability
to supply it. The Fund, in this case, may require the member
to sell it its currency for gold. Or the Fund may ask the
member permission to borrow its currency from the member or
elsewhere. The member has the right to refuse this request.
If "the demand for a member’s currency seriously threatens
the Fund’s ability to supply" it, the Fund "shall formally
y
declare such currency scarce," rationing its remaining supply.
This announcement entitles members to impose restrictions in the
use of their reserves of the currency, until such time as the
Fund formally declares the currency to be no longer scarce.
5) the obligation, under certain conditions, of members
to repurchase their currency. A member may repurchase, and the
Fund shall sell in exchange for gold, holdings of the member’s
currency in excess of its quota. In addition, provision is mad$
under certain conditions, for the compulsory repurchase by a mem-
ber of part of its currency held by the Fund, at the end of
each fiscal year. The amount of gold or convertible currencies
l/ Articles of Agreement of the Fund, VI, la
2/ Ibid., VII, 3a
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which a member shall use to repurchase its currency depends on
the increase in its monetary reserves during the year, the
composition of currencies making up these reserves, and the
Fund* s holdings of other currencies. As a result of the
repurchase, however, a member 1 s monetary reserves may not be
below its quota, the Fund 1 s holdings of its currency may not be
below 75$ of its quota, nor may the Fund* s holdings of any
currency which the member wishes to use in repurchase of its
currency be more than 75$ of the quota of the member concerned.
If the monetary reserves of a member have decreased during the
year more than the Fund 1 s holdings of its currency have increased,
it is not subject to repurchase of its currency.
6) the control over restrictions on current payments and of
discriminatory currency practices. It is one of the stated
purposes of the Fund to eliminate “foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of world trade;" therefore, no member
may “impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers
for current international transactions" nor "engage in.... any
discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency
y
practices," unless authorized by the Fund.
During the transitional period, preceding the time when
national economies are expected to be sufficiently well balanced
that maladjustments in their balance of payments will not be
severe or of long duration, the Fund may permit certain restric-
tive practices to be established or continued. Areas with a
weak productive capacity, those whose territory or property has
1/ Articles ofAgreement of the Fund, I(iv); VIII, 2a; VIII, 3.
(
'
’
'
!
'
’
« 1
'
t t
'
<
1
<
'
, V .
t
' ) 1
1
*
.
r r
i •
"i.
. ,
. Oj.
r r
’
. .
. * f
or
* f
,
r
. : > .)
t .
,
49
been severely damaged by war or who are underdeveloped, or who
have Inadequate gold or foreign exchange reserves may apply for
permission to continue or Introduce certain types of restrictions.
^ The Fund shall review such cases Individually and, if it permits
such measures, shall watch the progress of the country and may
alter its decision as conditions within a country change.
7) right to communicate its views to members. The Fund
has at all times 11 the right to communicate its views informally
to any member on any matter arising under. ..( the ) Agreement” and
it may under certain conditions publish a report to a member 1
concerning its "monetary or economic conditions and developments
wrhich directly tend to produce a serious disequilibrium in the
y
international balance of payments of members."
8) the right to make various charges. In order to encourage
members to correct maladjustments in tneir balance of payments
by means other than recourse to the Fund 1 s resources, to cover
handling costs of the Fund, and to add to the liquidity of the
Fund's resources, by encouraging a member to repurchase from the
Fund reserves of its currency in excess of its quota, the Fund
levies on each member a service charge for the purchase of
another member's currency, a handling charge for the sale or
purchase of gold, and a charge on the average daily balance of
its currency held by the Fund in excess of its quota. The
\ larger the holdings, the more punitive is the charge.
9) the right to declare a member inelgible to use the Fund's
resources or to expel a member. Failure by a member to fulfill
±r Articles of Agreement of the Fund, XII, 8
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iany of its obligations under the Agreement permits the Fund to
declare it ineligible to use its resources* If the member
continues to disregard its obligations, the Fund may expel it
from the organization.
10) the requirement that its members furnish detailed
information with respect to their financial and commercial
position. Members are responsible to the Fund for furnishing
whatever information it deems necessary for its operations, so
long a6 said information is not so detailed as to reveal the
affairs of individuals or corporations. As a minimum essential
for the effective discharge of the Fund*s duties, national data
on the following matters are required: the holdings of gold
and foreign exchange by a government and. unofficial fieccal
agencies; gold production, exports, and imports; value of total
exports and imports of merchandise, by country of destination
and origin; details regarding a member* s balance of international
payments and international investment position; the national
Income; price indices; buying and selling rates for foreign
currencies; and details regarding exchange controls and official
clearing arrangements, if any.
11) the right to cooperate with other international
bodies. "The Fund shall cooperate within the terms of... (the)
Agreement with any general international organization and with
public international organizations having specialized responsi-
bilities in related fields."
121- the control of relations between member and non-member
Articles of Agreement of the Fund, X
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countries. Members of the Fund agree not to engage in trans-
actions or cooperate in practices with non-members, contrary to
the provisions of the Agreement or the purposes of the Fund.
The Fund deals only with the Treasury, central bank,
stabilization fund, or other similar fiscal agency of its
members
.
Organization of the Fund consists of a Board of Governors,
a number of Executive Directors, a Managing Director, and a
staff. All powers are invested in the Board of Governors,
composed of one governor and one alternate appointed by each
member, and its interpretation of the Articles is final. The
Board serves chiefly as a policy-making body, relying on the
Executive Directors for the conduct of the general operations
of the Fund, and it has the right to transfer to them any of
its powers, with the exception of those having to do with the
admission of new members, approval of a revision of quotas,
approval of a uniform change in par values of member currencies,
cooperation with international agencies, determination of the
distribution of the Fund's net income, expulsion of a member,
the decision to liquidate the Fund, and appeals for inter-
pretation of the Agreement.
There shall not be le3£ than twelve Executive Directors, of
whom five are appointed by the five members with the largest
quotas, two by the American Republics not entitled to appoint
Directors, and five by other members not entitled to appoint
Directors. The Executive Directors appoint a Managing Director
boston uNlvtKsm'
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as their Chairman (Camille Gutt, at present), who exercisee the
vote at their meetings only in case of a tie. Responsible for
the activities of the staff, he is charged mainly with the
conduct of the ordinary business of the Fund. Both the
Managing Director and the staff pledge sole allegiance to the
Fund.
The Executive Directors function in continuous session,
unlike the Board, which holds an annual meeting and such
others as it may desire or as are called by the Executive
Directors.
Unless otherwise specified by the Agreement, all decisions
are based on a majority vote. Voting power of members depends
mainly on the size of their quotas. Each member has 250
votes plus one additional vote "for each part of its quota
equivalent to one hundred thousand United States dollars," plus
one vote "for the equivalent of each four hundred thousand
United States dollars of net sales of its currency" or minus
one vote for corresponding net purchases of foreign exchange
up to the date when the vote is taken. Based on quotas alone,
the United States has 32$ of the vote and the United Kingdom
controls 15$.
For the benefit of its members, the Fund is required to
publish an annual report containing an audited statement of its
accounts, in addition to more frequent summary statements of its
transactions and holdings of gold and foreign exchange.
\
The Fund does not provide facilities for relief or reconstruc-
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tion or deal with interna tional indebtedness arising out of
the war. Although outside aid for these purposes had to he
the responsibility of other sources, however, conferees at
^ Bretton Woods were anxious that the Fund begin operation as
soon as possible in the transitional period, because it was
felt that the Fund was essential during this period to serve
as an international payment and stabilization mechanism.
Without some cushion of reserves, such as the Fund provided,
the post-war shortage of exchange reserves and gold in numerous
countries might easily precipitate a series of unilateral and
bilateral measures damaging to world economic relations.
The exact duration of the transitional period for individual
countries was indeterminate, and it was considered imperative
to put into operation a program for international cooperation
at a time when governments felt most strongly "the unity of
purpose and energy of hope for better things to come, springing
1/
from the victory of the United Nations "
The Fund has been described by some of its American
supporters as an aid in the creation of an international
money market resembling that in existence under the gold
standard. Lord Keynes, on the other hand, asserted that they
were the opposite. There is some resemblence as well as a
marked difference between the two.
| The gold standard provided for certain specific conditions;
the unlimited buying and selling of gold at a fixed price and
and unlimited shipment among nations; the expression of monetary
1/ Halm, George N., op. cit., p.228

units in terms of weight units of gold; fixed exchange rates;
a minimum of exchange and commercial controls; and conservative
domestic fiscal policies. The internal and external values of
a currency were tied. Domestic policy adjusted itself to the
movement of gold, implying a flexibility of cost-price stuctures.
Under this system, theoretically, a deficit in a country* s
balance of payments necessitated the export of gold. This
exodus, in turn, contracted credit, which raised credit rates.
Higher interest rates attracted short-term funds and added to
the supply of foreign exchange. The contraction of credit
resulted in a fall in prices, a reduction in imports, and led
to an increase in exports. At the same time, the gold-receiving
country was experiencing the reverse set of conditions, until,
presumably, an equilibrium was established. Gold reserves,
therefore, were shock absorbers, whose movements resulted in
capital inflow and exportable surpluses. Theoretically, the
outcome of gold movements under the standard was staple and
predictable, and countries were kept in line without control
by international authority. Small early doses of inflation and
deflation were thought to prevent sharper crises.
The gold standard was dominant during a period of
rapidly-expanding world economy, characterized by rising prices.
Consequently
,
its deflationary bias was balanced by universal
credit expansion, increasing development of new industries and
new areas and the growing needs of a growing population. During
this period of well-integrated complementary international
* r - ~
r
i
)
1 '
.
.
; r o n
n
:
<
^
r._ '
r
|
r 1 •
'
' «
, \ ( ' . r
'
;
(
r V r 0 -
«
r f,' jirc.f
3 '
« > c
D:.
I
V
3 <"
*
j
i c
‘
i
,
‘
r \ ' C n< T
C J
, :
)
O
.
r c
r :
r
r - : . f
1
i c
n
(. -
.
r
r
J
nr
55
economic relations, young countries obtained the goods necessary
for their development from industrially more mature countries
and paid for them in food and raw materials for which their
creditors had a need.
In the long run, predominantly agricultural countries face
an inelastic! ty of demand for their products. At the same
time, their disbursements for debt service and industrial
goods (for whicn there is an elastic demand) tend to remain
s table o When capital does not enter the country, producers
lower their prices and, to maintain income, increase their
production. This causes a further reduction in prices,,
The period preceding World War I was characterized by an
absence of major national disorders, and capital movements
provided countries with adequate reserves. The relation of
price-cost to exchange rates was satisfactory, and wage rates
were reasonably flexible. Finally, central banks were pre-
occupied mainly with liquidity.
The gold standard has proven to be more deflationary in its
effects than inflationary . Although countries losing gold
are forced to contract due to a depletion in their monetary
reserves, an automatic expansion of credit does not take place
in gold-receiving countries. In addition, higher prices may
increase profit expectation and attract more rather than less
capital. This tends to raise prices still further. Credit
contraction in a country reduces the consumption of both
domestic and foreign goods and may have a contagious effect
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abroad. Thus the gold standard with its rigidity may spread
booms and depression, rather than inevitably produce an
equilibrium. The effect of the gold standard on a country
depends on the Importance of foreign trade to its economy. It
has fewer repercussions in a country where foreign trade is
secondary
.
The gold standard provides no means of adjusting exchange
rates no longer properly related after a boom-bust period
brought on by war or expressing cyclical movements or basic
changes in an economy. The gold standard sssumes the existence
of full employment. However, prices may be affected by output
and employment, as well as by gold movements.
In the interwar period, the maldistribution of gold and
weakened competitive position of many countries forced them to
abandon conservative fiscal policies, in which gold served as the
main determinant of credit, as they attempted to counter
deflationary pressures with such measures as deficit spending
programs and the creation of cheap money. Domestic monetary
policy based on internal economic stabilization became
increasingly a part of central banking policy, tying in with
national, trade and other policies. Full employment programs
took precedence over the maintenance of stable rates.
The growing rigidity of prices and costs in economic
structures under capitalism was an additional obstacle to the
effectiveness of the gold standard.
During the interwar period, fear of a drain on their
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weakened reserves and a desire to maintain an equilibrium in
their balance of payments caused many countries to introduce
controls on their capital movements.
Present and foreseeable world economic conditions differ
widely from those necessary to the smooth operation of the gold
standard. The world is faced with an absence of 'complementary
economic relations among countries, a maldistribution of gold,
unwillingness on the part of countries to subordinate domestic
to foreign policies and permit a binding tie-up between
external and internal values of their currencies, a growing
rigidity in cost and price structures, necessity for government
Intervention to prevent flights of capital, unwillingness to
abide by rigid exchange rates which fail to take into account
basic changes resulting from economic crises or growth, and a
reluctance to give up commercial or exchange restrictions,
whether for political or economic reasons.
Under the Fund, gold continues to serve as the unit of
international account, since the par values of member currencies
are fixed in terms of gold. Gold also helps the Fund maintain
the liquidity of its resources, because the Fund tends to
convert its local currency reserves into gold, in order to
stand ready to buy scarce currencies. Member countries are
obliged to buy or sell gold at a price differing from the
parity by no more than a prescribed margin. This provision
introduces artificial gold points and renders competitive
exchange depreciation impossible. Currency transfers under the
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Fund may affect bank reserves in the manner of gold movements
under the gold standard. The same monetary and price
effects are theoretically possible, especially if the member
purchasing currency from the Fund has no reserves or if its
central bank is already losing gold and where the net creditor
does not have a large reserve of gold.
Unlike the gold standard mechanism, however, the Fund 1 s
reserves are available to its entire membership, independent
of the supply and present maldistribution of gold. Provisions
are made for orderly adjustments in exchange ra.tes, where they
are out of line with price and cost levels, and, under
certain conditions, exchange restrictions may be established
or continued. In addition, the Fund can persuade a member
to take appropriate measures, if a disequilibrium occurs in
its balance of payments.
Prominent opposition to the establishment of the Fund as
a workable solution to international monetary problems has
been voiced by the supporters of the key countries approach.
This group, led by Professor John H. Williams, contends that
external stability depends on the internal stability of key
countries. Because economic conditions in deficit countries
reflect the state of key countries, these should keep
economically strong, by collaboration, if possible, in their
internal affairs.
Professor Williams suggests that the first step in
effecting such a policy would be the joint stabilization of the
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dollar and the pound. Then a 6 other countries solved their
disequilibria individually, with the aid of such measures as
loans, they would be prepared to attach themselves to the
key currencies, eventuating in general equilibrium. As more
countries pegged their currencies to key countries 1
,
trade
would take on an increasingly multilateral character. Professor
Williams is skeptical as to the ability of the Fund to weather
the transitional period and, at the same time, achieve its
long-term objective, which, he feels, can be achieved more
simply through voluntary means and with a minimum of inter-
governmental control.
Professor Halm, in criticizing this viewpoint, argues that,
though aiming at multilateralism, it encourages the establish-
ment of a system of monetary blocs and might lead to bilateralism.
Since countries would not join these blocs until they had
corrected their maladjustments, they would not receive aid
when most urgent and might be forced to resort to such unilateral
measures as competitive exchange depreciation and exchange
control, unfavorable to other countries. The key countries
approach, therefore, would offer no broad framework favorable
to immediate collaboration and consultation on pertinent
international monetary affairs. The Fund would not only
offer this advantage but strives to shorten the transitional
A*
period of members, as well, with the help of its provisions
for orderly changes in exchange rates, gradual relaxation of
restrictive exchange practices, reserves of foreign exchange

60
and gold, and cooperation on related matters with other
international agencies.
The key countries approach would set up a system with
units of leaders and satellites which would render impossible
the generally non-political approach to economic matters which
the Fund professes. Political considerations would partially
determine the extension of credits necessary to stabilize
certain of the key countries, as well as the satellites,
and small countries might resent any resulting domination by
a key country. Smaller countries might attach themselves to
one key currency rather than to both the dollar and pound,
serving conceivably to create or widen serious differences
between key countries.
The purpose of the Fund is not to favor deficit countries
as against creditors. However, according to Professor Halm,
it is intended to dispose of the notion that debtors should
always suffer the consequences of maladjustments in their
balance of payments through deflationary pressures, since
in the past debtors have frequently been forced to such
action as a result of contradictory policies by creditors, e.g.
the simultaneous calling of loans or abrupt discontinuation
of credits and increases in tariff rates. “Deficit and credit
balances. . .are determined by exports and imports (of commodities,
1/
services, and securities^" which cause the policies of the creditor
countries with respect to wages, prices, credit, employment,
and tariffs c onstantly to influence the actions of debtor countries,
1/ Halm, George li, op. cit., p. 102
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To establish an equilibrium in international accounts, Mrs.
Robinson points out that creditors, aside from the outright
cancellation of debts have three alternatives:
1) a rise in Imports by
I improving the competitive position of the debtor
country through a )lowering tariffs; b)raising
domestic wages, and c )appreciating their currencies.
II bringing about "such an increase in employment and
expenditure" as to enable an increase in the
consumption of foreign as well as domestic goods.
2) making promising long-term investments equal to the
deficit involved.
3) the acceptance of gold which may lead to deflation or
protective measures. This method tends to lower the
level of activity at which the equilibrium in interna-
tional payments takes place. 1/
Professor Halm asserts that it is to the self-interest of
creditors to join the Fund. Without the reserves which the
Fund makes available, under certain condition^ to them, many
deficit countries would be forced to follow a policy of
encouraging an increase in exports and a reduction in imports.
The increase in exports might be accomplished by deflationary
measures or by competitive exchange depreciation. To decrease
imports, deficit countries might introduce protective and
exchange control measures. All these measures would be to the
disadvantage of the creditor countries. The Fund authorizes
exchange control and exchange depreciation, beyond 10$ of
initial rates, only under special conditions.
It has been argued that within the framework of the Fund
the creditors would grant borrowing rights without taking
into account credit worthiness. In this connection. Professor
IT Halm, George N., op. cit., p. 101
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Halm asserts that direct lending is not always superior to
indirect lending. He points out that countries making use
of their buying rights are "subjected to increasing pressure
by the . . . .Fund. . . to adopt policies .. .designed to help restore
y
international payment equilibrium." Secondly, the Fund
offers some diversification of risk. Thirdly, creditors would
grant foreign loans in any case. Anc^ fourthly, the creditor
stands a better chance of repayment under multilateral rather
than bilateral clearing conditions, since he can thus increase
his imports from any part of the world rather than from the
country under obligation to him.
Frofessor Williams raises objections to the philo^hy
underlying the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. This doctrine,
based mainly on the English classical theory of International
trade, assumes fixed productive factors and makes no allowance
for changes in the resources of countries. Based on the notion
of specialization and antithetical to mobility, it ignores the
fact that countries do not always simply produce exportable
surpluses but, rather, are guided by market and other conditions,
which may result in efforts toward greater self-sufficiency.
Countries vary in size, resources, climate, skills, location,
and flexibility in economic structure and do not pass through
similar stages in economic development at the same time.
Therefore, it is impractical to lay stress on uniformity of
policy. Young countries must increase their productivity
in order to increase their purchasing power, which, in turn,
1/ Halm, George N., op. cit., p. 97
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would "increase the future incomes of their customers." In
order to improve, their competitive position, Professor Williams
asserts that new traders and agricultural countries should have
more latitude in adjustments in their exchange rates and
especially in the imposition of exchange controls. Although
the Fund authorizes such measures under specific conditions, it
lays stress on gradual elimination of foreign exchange restric-
tions.
The Fund is at a serious disadvantage in its operations
by its lack of voice in domestic affairs. For example, a
member may be granted a change in its par value, necessitated
by unwise domestic measures. Credit creation and lending
policies are left to individual countries. However, domestic
affairs of a member are of concern to others. The inauguration
of deflationary measures by an important trader has contagious
effects, A desire on the part of a country for competitive
advantage and an unwillingness to forsake its sovereignty with
respect to this matter are likely to handicap cooperation among
members as to domestic policies, and the question arises as
to whether politics can be left out of Fund decisions related
to changes in exchange rates and authorization of exchange
restrictions. Countries will be reluctant to relinquish their
exchange controls, since these have become a political v/eapon
as well as an economic device.
Professor Williams questions the ability of the Fund to
become a major stabilizer when most international settlements
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will be made outside it. Countries may save their own reserves
for purchases generally detrimental to the purposes of the
Fund, e.g. for military preparation. Eig countries in which
^ trade is not a major factor in their national incomes will be
less concerned with the encouragement of economic measures
favorable to world trade.
The Articles of Agreement do not elaborate with respect
to possible recommendations on the part of the Fund to members
to restore equilibrium. Professor Halm states that the Fund
will probably rely on encouraging surplus countries to expand
their credit and increase foreign investment and it will
permit deficit countries to depreciate (although only where
warranted) and permit the introduction of exchange controls,
where advisable. To correct less fundamental deviations from
equilibrium, the recommendations of the Fund may dwell on
the use ef a country® s reserves of gold and foreign exchange,
if any. It is doubtful if the Fund will intrude in domestic
affairs relating to credit policy.
Three major obstacles to the workability of the Fund
in achieving its purpose of creating a monetary structure
encouraging to multilateralism are the effect of cyclical
movements, the existence and significance of cartels in certain
of the member countries, and the degree of narmony in general
) international relations. The Fund is Incapable of rescuing the
wor}.d from a general business crisis, 6uch as occurred during
the early 30* s; its reserves can be put to use only to alleviate
crises expressing short-term maladjustments. Cartels serve as

65
obstacles to trade, competition, output, employment, "just"
prices, and division of labor. In addition, their presence
may advance the interests of war rather than peace. In World
War II, their technology was used for war purposes by
totalitarian countries. A state in which a high level of
multilateral economic relations exists presupposes a peaceful
environment. However, there is no indication that the foresee-
able future will be anything but a state of suspended hostility
and of military preparation among powerful states.
The Fund will face certain hardships in producing an
orderly depreciation of exchange rates: 1) Determination of
proper exchange rates requires taking into consideration such
dynamic factors as national price levels and costs. 2) In
order to evaluate correctly the economic position of a member
requesting a change in rate, the Fund will be dependent to a
high degree on information submitted by that member. 5) The
Fund must concur in a proposed change "if It is satisfied that
y
the change is necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium."
Selection of this single criterion leads to an oversight of
the economic interrelationship among countries and the especially
powerful impact of such adjustments by major traders on smaller
ones. However, the Fund's inability to intervene in domestic
policies obviates its right to substitute other measures.
The Articles of Agreement set up a complicated financial
structure in highly general terms. Both the complexity and the
generality a rise from a number of factors. Since the Fund is
l/ Articles of Agreement of the Fund, IV, 5f
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set up to operate in the transitional period, as well as beyond
it, two different types of possible economic disorders are
taken into consideration. The compromise nature of the Articles,
in view of the variety and conflict in interests and problems
represented by countries potentially making up the membership
y
of the Fund has forced the use of much generality, in addition
to certain intricacies, renders Interpretation difficult.
Despite all the objections and doubts which the Fund
raises, it has definite merit. It can provide a strong and,
at the same time, flexible framework which would give the
creditor countries benefits through increased trade and spread
responsibility and risk, allowing creditors to stem dangerous
inflation by a refusal to lend their currency to the Fund as
a shortage appears. Deficit countries gain time to correct
their maladjustments without the need for immediate introduction
of deflationary measures. Furthermore, the right to use the
resources of the Fund is not accompanied by such forms of
domination as have accompanied private loans in the past.
The use of Fund reserves solely to cover temporary dis-
equilibria in their balance of payments, favors the unobstructed
movement of commodities, discourages unfair competition and
increases domestic stability. The Fund is based on the principle
and
of general exchange stability rather than rigidity, /it can take
into account changing conditions, aiming at the same time toward
the elimination of unwarranted exchange restrictions, and
TT Examples: creditors and debtors, capitalist and planned
economies, gold producers and importers, countries with a
weak reserve position and with a strong, countries with and
without exchange controls^
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substituting orderly for competitive exchange depreciation.
Professor Halm has pointed out that managed flexibility
of exchange rates results in the following additional
advantages: a) adequate flexibility in domestic policy
without the necessity for large reserves; b) the avoidance
of deflation without substituting expansion; c) the opportunity
to reduce restrictions during the transitional period.
The Fund, as a headquarters for international collaboration
and consultation, leads to an awareness on the part of members
of their interdependence and permits the coordination of
credit policies. Guided in its decision by the detailed
information to which it has access, the Fund may induce its
members to accept advice with respect to their domestic affairs,
favorable to the maintenance of international equilibrium.
Because of changing conditions, the existence of factors
over which the Fund has no control but which have a direct
bearing on its operations, unpredictable developments, absence
in its membership of countries having a strong impact on
world affairs, directly and indirectly affecting the Fund, and
conflicts in interests within it6 membership, the Fund cannot
attain fully its objectives, still less set up machinery for
automatic coordination of international monetary policy.
However, the machinery it has set up may serve to satisfy in
part the outstanding needs of our times in the field of interna-
tional monetary relations.
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VII THE INTERNATIONAL BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
The second principal world agency to come out of the
Bretton Woods conference was the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, which began operations June 25, 1S46.
The restoration of a system of widespread multilateral
economic relations calls for a smooth and regular flow of funds.
A responsibility of the Fund, with its resources for use in
current transactions, is to keep currencies relatively stable.
In order to accomplish this in the long run, effective measures
are required to strengthen and/or restore the economies of
member countries. This is the Bank l s primary function, imple-
mented by its right to extend long-term credits for productive
purposes and economic stabilization. In determining the uses
to which its funds will be put, the Bank will consider
reconstruction and development to be equally important.
Special consideration will be granted members whose "metropolitan
territories have suffered great devastation from enemy occupation
or hostilities."
The Bank will not take away any of the foreign loan
business of commercial banks. Instead, it will for the most
part encourage more such loans at less risk to the issuer.
It may assume their risk by guaranteeing private loans or it
may participate in loans. In certain cases, where private
banks are unwilling to lend, whether because of disagreement
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over rates or other conditions, the Bank may make direct loans.
In any case, every loan in which the Bank has a hand must
comply with certain conditions. It must he guaranteed by the
member country concerned or its principal fiscal agent, and
it must be approved by a competent committee appointed by the
Bank. Unless for long-term stabilization, the purpose for
which each loan is intended must be established as productive
and capable of earning enough to cover interest and amortization
costs. Finally, the Bank must receive assurance that the
loan is not obtainable at reasonable terms from private sources.
All loans are to be regularly amortized, and strict supervision
will be maintained over the purposes to which the credits are pub
Foreign loans are of great benefit where they result in an
addition to the productive resources of a country. At the same
time, however, they also burden the borrower. Not only must
the debtor raise the necessary money for payment of interest
and amortization in domestic currency, but this must be
transferred into the currency of the creditor. In order that
transfers may be effected, creditors in the long run 6hould have
an excess of imports over exports; conversely, debtors require
an excess of exports over imports. The safety of foreign
loans depends on the reasonableness of their total amount
compared to ability of a country to handle the transfer problem,
aw well as the reasonableness of each loan compared to the use
to which it is put.
In order to encourage a high level of trade, international
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loans should not be "tied loans," in which the borrower is
bound to spend the proce&s in the creditor country. This
type of loan leads to bilateralism and may result in economic
or political domination of a weaker by a stronger country.
Similarly, eollection of debts should be free of exchange
restrictions. The Bank 1 s borrowing procedures are based on
these principles and would enable borrowing and disbursements
in the most favorable market. One exception in the Bank’s
adherence to multilateralism is its reluctance to make domestic
loans save under exceptional circumstances.
The Bank’s assets are composed of its loan portfolio,
its paid-in capital, the uncalled 80$ of total subscription,
and other reserves. The capital stock of the Bank has been
set at $10 billion, all of it to be subscribed to by members,
and. its value will remain stable. Guarantees, participations,
and direct loans may be made up to and not exceeding 100$ of
unimpaired capital, reserves and surplus. Direct loans are
limited to 20$ of subscribed capital. Up to the present,
$3.0 billion has been subscribed to, 40$ of it by the United
States and 10$ by the United Kingdom. The size of its share
determines a member country’s voice in the management of the
Bank and limits its obligations. Unlike the Fund, however,
quotas do not determine the amount of loans or guarantees of
loans which a member can arrange with the Bank.
A member whose currency is involved in any loan made by or
through the Bank has the power of veto, because funds from
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such loans may be converted into any currency and might serve
to strain the exchange reserves of the country in whose currency
the loan is made.
The Bank will deal only through the chief fiscal agencies
of member countries, although it may make loans, in additions
to them, to their subdivisions or to Individuals or coporations
within their territory. The order of the issuance of loans
will depend on urgency, and all loans will take into account
their general effect on the economy of the borrower.
The Bank, like the Fund, has a Board of Governors, which
serves as policy-maker and whose interpretation with respect to
the Articles of Agreement is final. Unlike the Fund, however,
it has an advisory council representing different economic
interests. The rest of the personnel is made up of twelve
Executive Directors, headed by a President (currently John J.
McCloy) and a staff.
Provisions are made for the submission of reports by
the Bank of its operations and financial status and for the
submission by loan applicants of information regarding their
economic status.
Professor Williams has questioned the possibility of
creating a bank which is international in any more than a
formal sense, in view of the present world setup with only one
major creditor and numerous debtors. Frofessor Halm asserts
that it is international in more than a formal sense because it
can provide a higher degree of financial security than could
otherwise be obtained, by spreading the risk undertaken by
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members, by the guarantee of a loan by a member country ae well
as the borrower within its territory, and by reason of one of
the Bank’s main purposes— the prevention of losses through
making sound loans which would stren^hen a country’s productivity
and, indirectly, its export position.
Professor Williams’ pessemism is justifiable only in the
case of a "world-wide credit crisis." However, Bank loans may
help counter the downward trend in cyclical movements by
supplementing private investment, which tends to fall off
during a depression.
Success of the Bank in its operations and as a significant
weight in world economic stabilization will depend to an
important extent on conditions over which it has no control.
If, in succeeding years, military preparedness takes on
increasing importance, member countries will consider as
secondary productive enterprises for peacetime use, and an
interest in efficient production of peacetime goods will be
replaced by whatever changes are required in their economies,
for strengthening wartime machinery. Furthermore, governments
may devote their own monetary reserves to war preparation
and borrow from the Bank for non-military purposes. Since the
Bank must be guided in its decisions only by economic considera-
tions, it can indirectly help finance production which will
lead away from peaceful trade, a principle to which the Bank
is dedicated.
Although the Bank may be run on a sound basis, its impact
on international economic relations will depend on the magnitude
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of its loans, on the extent to which its membership is composed
of countries Important in foreign trade and general world
affairs, and on the success of other world agencies. Especially
important is the degree of success achieved in the field of
foreign trade policies,,

74
VIII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The recognition of the importance of trade to the well-
being of all participants is signified by the numerous trade
agreements between countries throughout the late ISth and
early 20th centuries, by the economic conferences that took
place in the interwar period in an attempt to restore world
trade to its previous high level, and by the intergovernmental
discussions of World War II, culminating in the Bret ton Woods
conference, in which was developed a comprehensive system
regulating governmental activity to produce an atmosphere
conducive to favorable trade conditions
«
Although the advisability of tra.de according to comparative
advantage is often stressed, such a policy carried to the
extreme is questionable. Some diversification is essential
to add to national independence and security and to take
into account the variation in stages of development, political,
social, and economic, through which nations are going. In
peacetime, monocultural areas traditionally have a low income
due to their extreme dependence on the demands of other nations.
Because commerce is the outcome of an uneven distribution
of resources, skills and climates among the countries and
peoples of the world, there will always be a strong justification
for nations to trade, unless impeded by restrictions imposed by
governments or individuals. The effect of such measures may be
a contraction of international economic relations or a partM.
prevention of their growth. Under such conditions, substitution
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may be brought into play, uneconomic domestic production
be introduced, or there may result a limitation, absolute or
relative, in the consumption of goods or services.
Trade under relatively free conditions is a complementary
in
rather than a competitive phenomenon, /which all participants
theoretically benefit from most efficient production. Exceptions
are underdeveloped, countries foregoing the advantages of
protection.
Economic stability breeds political stability, and,
historically, greater industrialization has resulted in a
higher standard of living. Although economic factors are
not necessarily a direct cause of war, they can be a major
contributing factor. Dissatisfaction that arises from defla-
tionary conditions within a country may lead to the political
support of individuals who favor a militant foreign policy
•«
.
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or who appeal to the prejudices and intolerance of the masses,
creating misunderstanding among nations or sectors of a
population and may eventually lead to civil or external war.
Since the dawn of the era of mass production, industrialized
countries, in order to produce economically, have had to find
external outlets for disposal of their surpluses. The most
efficient and complete employment of labor and resources,
therefore, generally depends in the long run on stable
international trade and, since there is a close tie-up between
finance and trade, on investment, and on the continuity of
peaceful foreign economic relations. In the long run, there is

no basis for trade unless the value of exports of goods,
services and securities approximate that of imports. Loans
to cover import balances serve to increase debts and only
postpone a final settlement.
The world is at present faced with two separate sets of
economic problems. There are, first of all, the short-term
needs for rehabilitation and reconstruction to restore countries
damaged by the war. This problem has been attached partly
by UNRRA, governmental loans, and outright gifts. Secondly,
certain long-term adjustments must be assured in order to
make extensive international economic relations possible.
These include the stabilization of currencies, in relation to
each other, the strengthening of economies chronically faced
with an unfavorable balance of trade, the supply of adequate
amounts of capital for these purposes, relief from maldistri-
bition of gold, some relaxation in restrictions pertaining
to commercial practices and exchange control, and a " settler"
of balances in international payments, universally acceptable
and available.
Prior to World War I, the world economy was based on a
well-integrated complementary basis, due to the fact that
every country had adequate outlets for its surpluses. G-old
served as a balancing item in the settlement of international
accounts.
By the beginning of the 1920 T s, the world had undergone
basic changes in its economic structure. The war had pro-
of foreign exchange and gold, the
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expansion of their productive capacity had created a smaller
demand for agricultural products abroad, and countries were
burdened with reparations, war debts, the costs of reconstruction,
and inflation. The United States in the meantime had become
a creditor with the result that its continued export biance
of
increased the need for dollars, instead, as formerly, /being
used to meet American obligations. Gold became an item of
commerce, serving as a means of paying for imports, without
producing the expectation that exports would be increased due
to inflationary pressures on the credit position of the gold-
receiving country.
A short-lived return to the gold standard on the part of
most countries during the last half of the 20 } s proved unsuccess-
ful. As they shipped gold to settle import balances, their
monetary position deteriorated, forcing them to depreciate
their currencies. An era of managed currencies ensued. The
inelasticity of demand for the produce of agricultural countries
plus greater self-sufficiency in agricultural goods on the
part of industrial countries and a persistent export balance on
the part of the United States finally forced deficit countries
to resort to measures encouraging maximum exports and minimum
imports. This policy was implemented by bilateral trading
agreements, licensing systems, exchange control, higher tariffs,
import quotas and the like. There eventually developed a heavy
network of restrictions.
The tie between the internal and external exchange value

of currencies had been gradually pulled apart in the interwar
period. In order to lessen the impact of economic disorders,
with their deflationary effect, which tended to produce a
curtailment in production, employment and national income,
countries strengthened their central banking policy, curtailing
the effect of gold on their credit structure, imposing measures
controlling capital movements to prevent dangerous flights out
of the country, and restricting the use of their exehange
reserves to maintain an equilibrium in their balance of
international payments. The outcome of governmental interference
in the interwar years in commerce and capital movements was
a partial breakdown in international economic relations.
In recognition of the failure of the single-handed approach
of countries during the interwar period in solving their
economic maladjustments, the Bretton Woods conference drafted
plans to establish two permanent international institutions,
enabling countries to attack Jointly obstacles to more extensive
commercial and monetary relations. Through the creation of the
Fund, a pool of foreign exchange was made available to member
countries for use in correcting maladjustments in current
transactions in their balance of payments, in order to give
them time to correct more basic economic maladjustments.
Provision was made for orderly depreciation, where necessary,
and a gradual relaxation of exchange restrictions. Through
the Bank, credits were made available for investments estimated
to earn enough for fixed charges and amortization and leading
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to an increase in the productivity of the "borrowing country.
The Fund and Bank have begun operation under definite
handicaps. Their pattern of activity must be superimposed
over cyclical movements over which they have no control, but
the effects of which they may attempt to counter. There is
no indication that the world faces an era of peace and that
expenditures for military considerations will be minor. Not
all countries with a major impact on general international
affairs have become members of the Bretton Woods agencies, and
certain of present arrangements between non-members are not
conducive to an extension of multilateral trade. The Fund has
no jurisdiction over the domestic policies of its membership.
In place of an overall approach to such monetary questions as
credit, the Fund will base its decisions on a piecemeal
approach to the solution of economic problems coming under its
jurisdiction.
Wise investment on the part of the Bank is imperative
to the maintenance of its liquidity and the production of the
degree of economic strength required by borrowers to pay off
their Bank obligations, reduce the transfer problem and, .
indirectly, enable the Fund to carry on its duties.
The effectiveness of the Fund and Bank will depend to a
considerable extent on the establishment and success of other
world agencies charged with such responsibilities as the
improvement of political relations among countries and the
reduction of restrictive commercial practices. In turn, the
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effectiveness of these agencies as well as the Fund and Bank
will also depend on the Importance in world relations of the
countries composing their membership.
Although the obstacles to the establishment of smooth
international economic relations seem almost insurmountable,
members of the Bret ton Woods agencies are prompted to cooperative
action in financial matters by the knowledge that immobility is
no policy.
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COMPREHENSIVE ABSTRACT
during World War II, governments of a number of principal
countries set out to formulate plans and create machinery
which would carry over into peacetime Intergovernmental
collaboration in various spheres of mutual interest. A
prominent area of endeavor was that of international economic
relations: the stabilization of par values of currencies
and a gradual relaxation of exchange restrictions, provision
for a regular, ordered flow of credits, and abolition or
reduction of commercial practices detrimental to multilateral
trade. Plans for the latter are still in the formative stage.
Before World War I, world trade and foreign monetary
transactions were voluminous and multilateral in character.
The gold standard provided for unimpeded movements of gold
from one country to another which, with the provision for
convertibili ty of currencies, were the main determinant of
price and interest levels and, therefore, the credit structure
and level of commerce within a country. Gold moving into
a net exporter in payment for goods and services drove upward
its general level of prices, causing domestic consumers to
purchase abroad in the country undergoing deflation, as a
result of shipment of its gold. Generally, this had the
effect of lowering prices of the net exporter and raising
those of the net importer, effecting an equilibrium.
The prosperity of this period was based on the complementary
nature of the world economy. In which Industrial countries 1
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served as both standing markets for agricultural products
and suppliers of industrial products necessary to the Internal
development of younger countries. It was an era of great
expansion.
Subsequently, the world underwent basic economic changes,
partly as a result of World War I, and, in ISIS, the old system
of automatic corrective forces in the monetary system was
unworkable in most countries. There was a reduction in the
degree of complementary economic relations among nations
necessary to such a system. Industrial countries in quest for
wartime self-sufficiency had increased their productive
opacity for both industrial and agricultural products. As
a result, there developed a world-wide overcapacity of
agricultural products and raw materials. The sources of
income of some countries had been adversely affected by the
foreign
wafc through physical damage, liquidation of/securities,
and a generally greater dependence on home production. The
peace treaties added to the general disorder by the imposition
of heavy reparations and by the break-up of economically
complementary units into small nations, which immediately
imposed tariffs for protection. The United States changed from
a debtor to a creditor nation in the interval, and her Allies
were burdened with $10 billion worth of war debts. At the
same time, the United States continued to maintain a substantial
export balance.
The interwar period brought no solution to the troubled
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economic climate. Most countries, clow to return to the gold
standard, fixed the exchange rate of their currencies at a
value lower than tefore hostilities. There followed several
years in which the gold standard in countries other than the
United States was maintained substantially through the outward
flow of funds of private American investors. At the same
time, led by the United States, many countries imposed or
increased tariff rates, resulting in some reduction in world
trade
.
The biggest obstacle facing most countries was the transfer
problem—in order to meet their foreign obligations, they had
to procure the necessary foreign exchange. Prior to the war,
this was ensured through an extensive network of commercial
and financial transactions. Now, however, trade was sufficiently
stagnant that, without the use of foreign credits, countries
were, for the most part, forced to default. This was a
common occurrence after American investors stopped lending
abroad in the late 20 ! s. Reparations likewise came to an end.
By the end of the depression, most countries had depreciated
their currencies and had substituted managed currencies for
the gold standard. The maldistribution of gold sharpened,
tariffs were supplemented by other restrictive measures,
limiting the use of exchange and the degree of commerce, in
both relative and absolute terms.
By the late 30* s, the western world was made up largely
of trading blocs, in which the currency of members was gpierally
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linked to that of their leader, and trade was based on discrimina-
tion toward outsiders. Numerous bilateral trading agreements
lowered still further the level of trade. During the 30 T s, the
scarcity of American dollars and political uncertainty (as the
40* s approached) led to a consistent flow of currency and gold
into the United States'. This had the tendency to make even
more precarious the financial structure of countries losing
their gold and dollar reserves and forced them, increasingly,
to tighten measures to minimize imports.
A dramatic contrast was noticeable between international
economic relations before World War I and World War II.
In the interwar period, they had been subordinated to domestic
policies, based on measures to offset deflationary pressures, and
implemented by government regulation* Commercial and monetary
transactions had been substantially reduced and tended toward
bilateral arrangements.
During World War II, the United Nations collaborated in
such vital spheres as military, financial and economic affairs.
In this atmosphere of cooperation, plans were formulated on an
intergovernmental scale to attack in peacetime obstacles that
might prevent the erection of mutually beneficial multilateral
economic relations. A sincere interest on the part of the
United States in this matter was evidenced by the earlier
passage of the Lend-Lease Act, which avoided the post-war
burden of heavy new debts, whose proceeds had gone, for the
most part, to unproductive uses.
t1
*
1
<
*
<
( t
i
c
<
,
‘ ' o
'
r
r
‘
„
if';
.
<
c r ' :
n
.
•
—
_
<
f t
'
* :
f
The planning efforts of the United and associated Nations
in the foreign economic sphere were climaxed in the Bretton
Woods conference in 1944, represented by 44 countries. These
drafted plans for the creation of two permanent world agencies,
the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, with the functions of,
respectively, a) the establishment of a pool of foreign
exchange and gold contributed by member countries in order to
aid deficit countries to correct dlsequilibria in their
current account in their balance of payments and to give
them time to correct more basic maladjustments, the stabilization
of exchange values of member currencies and the gradual
elimination of exchange restrictions, and b) the provision of
long-term credits to members at reasonable rates for productive
purposes and stabilization in order to strengthen their pro-
ductive facilities and, indirectly, their export position.
The Fund began operations in March 1S47 and the Bank in June
1946. Each has a membership at present of 43 countries.
Both agencies face impressive obstacles in their operations.
Although American dollars constitute a major part of its assets,
the Fund has no means of ensuring an ample supply of it or any
other currency beyond the initial contribution. Therefore, a
solution to the problem of scarce currencies must continue to
depend on domestic policies and other external factors.
In order to establish a more regular flow of credits, great
care will be required by the Bank in the evaluation of the

purposes for which its capit&l is intended and the supervision
of their use. The final tests will be the ability for these
funds to earn fixed and amortization charges and the ability of
the borrowing country to meet its overall transfer problem,
through a favorable balance of trade.
The fact was stressed at Bretton Woods that the limited
functions and powers of the two agencies would necessarily
prevent them from ensuring a return to extensive multilateral
trade, since this would require concerted action along still
other lines. Other decisive factors over which the agencies
have no control are an -absence in their membership at present
of countries important in affairs having a direct or indirect
bearing on fund or Bank affaifs, the economic arrangements
among non-members, general economic conditions, the extent to
which future production and distribution is based on economic
considerations for a peacetime economy rather than military
and political considerations, and the success of other inter-
national bodies in fields affecting international economic
relations
.
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Annex A
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The Governments on whose behalf the present Agreement is signed
agree as follows:
Introductory Article
The International Monetary Fund is established and shall operate
in accordance with the following provisions:
Article I
PURPOSES
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through
a permanent institution which provides the machinery for
consultation and collaboration on international monetary
problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of inter-
national trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion
and maintenance of high levels of employment and real
income and to the development of the productive resources
of all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange
arrangements among members, and to avoid competitive
exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of
payments in respect of current transactions between mem-
bers and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions
which hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund’s
resources available to them under adequate safeguard's,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjust-
ments in their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and
lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international
balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its decisions by the purposes set forth
in this Article.
28
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Article II
MEMBERSHIP
Section 1. Original members
The original members of the Fund shall be those of the countries
represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Confer-
ence whose governments accept membership before the date specified
in Article XX, Section 2 (e).
Section 2. Other members
Membership shall be open to the governments of other countries
at such times and in accordance with such terms as may be prescribed
by the Fund.
Article III
QUOTAS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS
Section 1. Quotas
Each member shall be assigned a quota. The quotas of the mem-
bers represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial
Conference which accept membership before the date specified in
Article XX, Section 2 (e), shall be those set forth in Schedule A. The
quotas of other members shall be determined by the Fund.
Section 2. Adjustment oj quotas
The Fund shall at intervals of five years review, and if it deems it
appropriate propose an adjustment of, the quotas of the members.
It may also, if it thinks fit, consider at any other time the adjustment
of any particular quota at the request of the member concerned. A
four-fifths majority of the total voting power shall be required for
any change in quotas and no quota shall be changed without the con-
sent of the member concerned.
Section 3. Subscriptions: time, place, and form of payment
(a) The subscription of each member shall be equal to its quota
and shall be paid in full to the Fund at the appropriate depositor}7 on
or before the date when the member becomes eligible under Article
XX, Section 4 (c) or (d), to buy currencies from the Fund.
(b) Each member shall pay in gold, as a minimum, the smaller of
(i) twenty-five percent of its quota; or
(ii) ten percent of its net official holdings of gold and United
States dollars as at the date when the Fund notifies members
under Article XX, Section 4 (a) that it will shortly be in a
position to begin exchange transactions.
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Each member shall furnish to the Fund the data necessary to deter-
mine its net official holdings of gold and United States dollars.
(c) Each member shall pay the balance of its quota in its own
currency.
(d) If the net official holdings of gold and United States dollars of
any member as at the date referred to in (b) (ii) above are not ascer-
tainable because its territories have been occupied by the enemy,
the Fund shall fix an appropriate alternative date for determining
such holdings. If such date is later than that on which the country
becomes eligible under Article XX, Section 4 (c) or (d), to buy cur-
rencies from the Fund, the Fund and the member shall agree on a
provisional gold payment to be made under (b) above, and the balance
of the member’s subscription shall be paid in the member’s currency,
subject to appropriate adjustment between the member and the Fund
when the net official holdings have been ascertained.
Section 4. Payments when quotas are changed
(a) Each member which consents to an increase in its quota shall,
within thirty days after the date of its consent, pay to the Fund
twenty-five percent of the increase in gold and the balance in its own
currency. If, however, on the date when the member consents to
an increase, its monetary reserves are less than its new quota, the
Fund may reduce the proportion of the increase to be paid in gold.
(b) If a member consents to a reduction in its quota, the Fund shall,
within thirty days after the date of the consent, pay to the member
an amount equal to the reduction. The payment shall be made in the
member’s currency and in such amount of gold as may be necessary
to prevent reducing the Fund’s holdings of the currency below seventy-
five percent of the new quota.
Section 5. Substitution oj securities jor currency
The Fund shall accept from any member in place of any part of
the member’s currency which in the judgment of the Fund is not
needed for its operations, notes or similar obligations issued by the
member or the depository designated by the member under Article
XIII, Section 2, which shall be non-negotiable, non-interest bearing
and payable at their par value on demand by crediting the account
of the Fund in the designated depository. This Section shall apply
not only to currency subscribed by members but also to any currency
otherwise due to, or acquired by, the Fund.
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Article IV
PAR VALUES OF CURRENCIES
Section 1 . Expression oj par values
(a) The par value of the currency of each member shall be ex-
pressed in terms of gold as a common denominator or in terms of the
United States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1,
1944.
(b) All computations relating to currencies of members for the
purpose of applying the provisions of this Agreement shall be on the
basis of their par values.
Section 2. Gold purchases based on par values
The Fund shall prescribe a margin above and below par value for
transactions in gold by members, and no member shall buy gold at a
price above par value plus the prescribed margin, or sell gold at a price
below par value minus the prescribed margin.
Section 3. Foreign exchange dealings based on parity
The maximum and the minimum rates for exchange transactions
between the currencies of members taking place within their territories
shall not differ from parity
(i) in the case of spot exchange transactions, by more than one
percent; and
(ii) in the case of other exchange transactions, by a margin
which exceeds the margin for spot exchange transactions by
more than the Fund considers reasonable.
Section 4. Obligations regarding exchange stability
(a) Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to
promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments with other members, and to avoid competitive exchange
alterations.
(b) Each member undertakes, through appropriate measures
consistent with this Agreement, to permit within its territories
exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of
other members only within the limits prescribed under Section 3 of
this Article. A member whose monetary authorities, for the settle-
ment of international transactions, in fact freely buy and sell gold
within the limits prescribed by the Fund under Section 2 of this
Article shall be deemed to be fulfilling this undertaking.
Section 5. Changes in par values
(a) A member shall not propose a change in the par value of its
currency except to correct a fundamental disequilibrium.
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(b) A change in the par value of a member’s currency may be
made only on the proposal of the member and only after consultation
with the Fund.
(c) When a change is proposed, the Fund shall first take into
account the changes, if any, which have already taken place in the
initial par value of the member’s currency as determined under Article
XX, Section 4. If the proposed change, together with all previous
changes, whether increases or decreases,
(i) does not exceed ten percent of the initial par value, the
Fund shall raise no objection,
(ii) does not exceed a further ten percent of the initial par value,
the Fund may either concur or object, but shall declare its
attitude within seventy-two hours if the member so requests,
(iii) is not within (i) or (ii) above, the Fund may either concur
or object, but shall be entitled to a longer period in which
to declare its attitude.
(d) Uniform changes in par values made under Section 7 of this
Article shall not be taken into account in determining whether a
proposed change falls within (i), (ii), or (iii) of (c) above.
(e) A member may change the par value of its currency without
the concurrence of the Fund if the change does not affect the inter-
national transactions of members of the Fund.
(f) The Fund shall concur in a proposed change which is within
the terms of (c) (ii) or (c) (iii) above if it is satisfied that the change is
necessary to correct a fundamental disequilibrium. In particular,
provided it is so satisfied, it shall not object to a proposed change
because of the domestic social or political policies of the member
proposing the change.
Section 6. Effect of unauthorized changes
If a member changes the par value of its currency despite the
objection of the Fund, in cases where the Fund is entitled to object,
the member shall be ineligible to use the resources of the Fund unless
the Fund otherwise determines; and if, after the expiration of a
reasonable period, the difference between the member and the Fund
continues, the matter shall be subject to the provisions of Article
XV, Section 2 (b).
Section 7. Uniform changes in par values
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 5 (b) of this Article, the
Fund by a majority of the total voting power may make uniform pro-
portionate changes in the par values of the currencies of all members,
provided each such change is approved by every member which has
ten percent or more of the total of the quotas. The par value of a
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member’s currency shall, however, not be changed under this pro-
vision if, within seventy-two hours of the Fund’s action, the member
informs the Fund that it does not wish the par value of its currency
to be changed by such action.
Section 8. Maintenance of gold value of the Fund's assets
(a) The gold value of the Fund’s assets shall be maintained not-
withstanding changes in the par or foreign exchange value of the
currency of any member.
(b) Whenever (i) the par value of a member’s currency is reduced,
or (ii) the foreign exchange value of a member’s currency has, in the
opinion of the Fund, depreciated to a significant extent within that
member’s territories, the member shall pay to the Fund within a
reasonable time an amount of its own currency equal to the reduction
in the gold value of its currency held by the Fund.
(c) Whenever the par value of a member’s currency is increased,
the Fund shall return to such member within a reasonable time an
amount in its currency equal to the increase in the gold value of its
currency held by the Fund.
(d) The provisions of this Section shall apply to a uniform propor-
tionate change in the par values of the currencies of all members,
unless at the time when such a change is proposed the Fund decides
otherwise.
Section 9. Separate currencies within a member's territories
A member proposing a change in the par value of its currency shall
be deemed, unless it declares otherwise, to be proposing a correspond-
ing change in the par value of the separate currencies of all territories
in respect of which it has accepted this Agreement under Article XX,
Section 2 (g). It shall, however, be open to a member to declare that
its proposal relates either to the metropolitan currency alone, or only
to one or more specified separate currencies, or to the metropolitan
currency and one or more specified separate currencies.
Article V
TRANSACTIONS WITH THE FUND
Section 1. Agencies dealing with the Fund
Each member shall deal with the Fund only through its Treasury,
central bank, stabilization fund or other similar fiscal agency and the
Fund shall deal only with or through the same agencies.
Section 2. Limitation on the Fund's operations
Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, operations on the
account of the Fund shall be limited to transactions for the purpose
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of supplying a member, on the initiative of such member, with the
currency of another member in exchange for gold or for the currency
of the member desiring to make the purchase.
Section 3. Conditions governing use oj the Fund’s resources
(a) A member shall be entitled to buy the currency of another
member from the Fund in exchange for its own currency subject to
the following conditions:
(i) The member desiring to purchase the currency represents
that it is presently needed for making in that currency
payments which are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement;
(ii) The Fund has not given notice under Article VII, Section 3,
that its holdings of the currency desired have become scarce
;
(iii) The proposed purchase would not cause the Fund’s holdings
of the purchasing member’s currency to increase by more
than twenty-five percent of its quota during the period of
twelve months ending on the date of the purchase nor to
exceed two hundred percent of its quota, but the twenty-five
percent limitation shall apply only to the extent that the
Fund’s holdings of the member’s currency have been
brought above seventy-five percent of its quota if they
had been below that amount;
(iv) The Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of
this Article, Article IV, Section 6, Article VI, Section 1,
or Article XV, Section 2 (a), that the member desiring to
purchase is ineligible to use the resources of the Fund.
(b) A member shall not be entitled without the permission of the
Fund to use the Fund’s resources to acquire currency to hold against
forward exchange transactions.
Section 4. Waiver oj conditions
The Fund may in its discretion, and on terms which safeguard its
interests, waive any of the conditions prescribed in Section 3 (a) of
this Article, especially in the case of members with a record of avoid-
ing large or continuous use of the Fund’s resources. In making a
waiver it shall take into consideration periodic or exceptional require-
ments of the member requesting the waiver. The Fund shall also take
into consideration a member’s willingness to pledge as collateral
security gold, silver, securities, or other acceptable assets having a
value sufficient in the opinion of the Fund to protect its interests and
may require as a condition of waiver the pledge of such collateral
security.
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Section 5. Ineligibility to use the Fund's resources
Whenever the Fund is of the opinion that any member is using the
resources of the Fund in a manner contrary to the purposes of the
Fund, it shall present to the member a report setting forth the views
of the Fund and prescribing a suitable time for reply. After presenting
such a report to a member, the Fund may limit the use of its resources
by the member. If no reply to the report is received from the member
within the prescribed time, or if the reply received is unsatisfactory,
the Fund may continue to limit the member’s use of the Fund’s
resources or may, after giving reasonable notice to the member,
declare it ineligible to use the resources of the Fund.
Section 6. Purchases oj currencies from the Fundfor gold
(a) Any member desiring to obtain, directly or indirectly, the
currency of another member for gold shall, provided that it can do so
with equal advantage, acquire it by the sale of gold to the Fund.
(b) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude any
member from selling in any market gold newly produced from mines
located within its territories.
Section 7. Repurchase by a member of its currency held by the Fund
(a) A member may repurchase from the Fund and the Fund shall
sell for gold any part of the Fund’s holdings of its currency in excess
of its quota.
(b) At the end of each financial year of the Fund, a member shall
repurchase from the Fund with gold or convertible currencies, as
determined in accordance with Schedule B, part of the Fund’s holdings
of its currency under the following conditions:
(i) Each member shall use in repurchases of its own currency
from the Fund an amount of its monetary reserves equal in
value to one-half of any increase that has occurred during the
year in the Fund’s holdings of its currency plus one-half of
any increase, or minus one-half of any decrease, that has
occurred during the year in the member’s monetary reserves.
This rule shall not apply when a member’s monetary reserves
have decreased during the year by more than the Fund’s
holdings of its currency have increased.
(ii) If after the repurchase described in (i) above (if required) has
been made, a member’s holdings of another member’s cur-
rency (or of gold acquired from that member) are found to
have increased by reason of transactions in terms of that
currency with other members or peisons in their territories,
the member whose holdings of such currency (or gold) have
thus increased shall use the increase to repurchase its own
currency from the Fund.
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(c) None of the adjustments described in (b) above shall be carried
to a point at which
(i) the member’s monetary reserves are below its quota, or
(ii) the Fund’s holdings of its currency are below seventy-five
percent of its quota, or
(iii) the Fund’s holdings of any currency required to be used are
above seventy-five percent of the quota of the member
concerned.
Section 8. Charges
(a) Any member buying the currency of another member from the
Fund in exchange for its own currency shall pay a service charge
uniform for all members of three-fourths percent in addition to the
parity price. The Fund in its discretion may increase this service
charge to not more than one percent or reduce it to not less than
one-half percent.
(b) The Fund may levy a reasonable handling charge on any
member buying gold from the Fund or selling gold to the Fund.
(c) The Fund shall levy charges uniform for all members which
shall be payable by any member on the average daily balances of its
currency held by the Fund in excess of its quota. These charges shall
be at the following rates:
(i) On amounts not more than twenty
-Jive percent in excess oj the
quota: no charge for the first three months; one-half percent
per annum for the next nine months; and thereafter an in-
crease in the charge of one-half percent for each subsequent
year.
(ii) On amounts more than twenty-jive percent and not more than
fifty percent in excess oj the quota: an additional one-half per-
cent for the first year; and an additional one-half percent for
each subsequent year.
(iii) On each additional bracket oj twenty-jive percent in excess of
the quota: an additional one-half percent for the first year;
and an additional one-half percent for each subsequent year.
(d) Whenever the Fund’s holdings of a member’s currency are such
that the charge applicable to any bracket for any period has reached
the rate of four percent per annum, the Fund and the member shall
consider means by which the Fund’s holdings of the currency can be
reduced. Thereafter, the charges shall rise in accordance with the
provisions of (c) above until they reach five percent and failing agree-
ment, the Fund may then impose such charges as it deems appropriate.
(e) The rates referred to in (c) and (d) above may be changed by a
three-fourths majority of the total voting power.
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(f) All charges shall be paid in gold. If, however, the member’s
monetary reserves are less than one-half of its quota, it shall pay in
gold only that proportion of the charges due which such reserves bear
to one-half of its quota, and shall pay the balance in its own currency.
Article VI
CAPITAL TRANSFERS
Section 1 . Use of the Fund’s resources for capital transfers
(a) A member may not make net use of the Fund’s resources to
meet a large or sustained outflow of capital, and the Fund may
request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of the
resources of the Fund. If, after receiving such a request, a member
fails to exercise appropriate controls, the Fund may declare the
member ineligible to use the resources of the Fund.
(b) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed
(i) to prevent the use of the resources of the Fund for capital
transactions of reasonable amount required for the expansion
of exports or in the ordinary course of trade, banking or
other business, or
(ii) to affect capital movements which are met out of a member’s
own resources of gold and foreign exchange, but members
undertake that such capital movements will be in accordance
with the purposes of the Fand.
Section 2. Special provisionsfor capital transfers
If the Fund’s holdings of the currency of a member have remained
below seventy-five percent of its quota for an immediately preceding
period of not less than six months, such member, if it has not been
declared ineligible to use the resources of the Fund under Section 1 of
this Article, Article IV, Section 6, Article V, Section 5, or Article XV,
Section 2 (a), shall be entitled, notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 1 (a) of this Article, to buy the currency of another member
from the Fund with its own currency for any purpose, including
capital transfers. Purchases for capital transfers under this Section
shall not, however, be permitted if they have the effect of raising the
Fund’s holdings of the currency of the member desiring to purchase
above seventy-five percent of its quota, or of reducing the Fund’s
holdings of the currency desired below seventy-five percent of the
quota of the member whose currency is desired.
Section 3 . Controls of capital transfers
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate
international capital movements, but no member may exercise these
controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current trans-
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actions or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of
commitments, except as provided in Article VII, Section 3 (b), and in
Article XIV, Section 2.
Article VII
SCARCE CURRENCIES
Section 1 . General scarcity oj currency
If the Fund finds that a general scarcity of a particular currency is
developing, the Fund may so inform members and may issue a report
setting forth the causes of the scarcity and containing recommenda-
tions designed to bring it to an end. A representative of the member
whose currency is involved shall participate in the preparation of the
report.
Section 2. Measures to replenish the Fund’s holdings oj scarce cur-
rencies
The Fund may, if it deems such action appropriate to replenish its
holdings of any member’s currency, take either or both of the following
steps:
(i) Propose to the member that, on terms and conditions agreed
between the Fund and the member, the latter lend its cur-
rency to the Fund or that, with the approval of the member,
the Fund borrow such currency from some other source either
within or outside the territories of the member, but no
member shall be under any obligation to make such loans
to the Fund or to approve the borrowing of its currency by
the Fund from any other source.
(ii) Require the member to sell its currency to the Fund for gold.
Section 3. Scarcity oj the Fund’s holdings
(a) If it becomes evident to the Fund that the demand for a mem-
ber’s currency seriously threatens the Fund’s ability to supply that
currency, the Fund, whether or not it has issued a report under Sec-
tion 1 of this Article, shall formally declare such currency scarce and
shall thenceforth apportion its existing and accruing supply of the
scarce currency with due regard to the relative needs of members, the
general international economic situation and any other pertinent con-
siderations. The Fund shall also issue a report concerning its action.
(b) A foimal declaration under (a) above shall operate as an
authoiization to any member, after consultation with the Fund,
temporarily to impose limitations on the freedom of exchange oper-
ations in the scarce currency. Subject to the provisions of Article
IV, Sections 3 and 4, the member shall have complete jurisdiction in
determining the nature of such limitations, but they shall be no more
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restrictive than, is necessary to limit the demand for the scarce cur-
rency to the supply held by, or accruing to, the member in question;
and they shall be relaxed and removed as rapidly as conditions permit.
(c) The authorization under (b) above shall expire whenever the
Fund formally declares the currency in question to be no longer scarce.
Section 4. Administration of restrictions
Any member imposing restrictions in respect of the currency of any
other member pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of this
Article shall give sympathetic consideration to any representations
by the other member regarding the administration of such restric-
tions.
Section 5. Effect of other international agreements on restrictions
Members agree not to invoke the obligations of any engagements
entered into with other members prior to this Agreement in such a
manner as will prevent the operation of the provisions of this Article.
Article VIII
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS
Section 1. Introduction
In addition to the obligations assumed under other articles of this
Agreement, each member undertakes the obligations set out in this
Article.
Section 2. Avoidance of restrictions on current 'payments
(a) Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3 (b), and
Article XIV, Section 2, no member shall, without the approval of the
Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers
for current international transactions.
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that
member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement
shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member. In addition,
members may, by mutual accord, co-operate in measures for the pur-
pose of making the exchange control regulations of either member
more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are
consistent with this Agreement.
Section 3. Avoidance of discriminatory currency practices
No member shall engage in, or permit any of its fiscal agencies
referred to in Article V, Section 1, to engage in, any discriminatory
currency arrangements or multiple currency practices except as au-
thorized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund. If such
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arrangements and practices are engaged in at the date when this
Agreement enters into force the member concerned shall consult with
the Fund as to their progressive removal unless they are maintained
or imposed under Article XIV, Section 2, in which case the provisions
of Section 4 of that Article shall apply.
Section 4. Convertibility ojforeign held balances
(a) Each member shall buy balances of its currency held by another
member if the latter, in requesting the purchase, represents
(i) that the balances to be bought have been recently acquired
as a result of current transactions; or
(ii) that their conversion is needed for making payments for cur-
rent transactions.
The buying member shall have the option to pay either in the currency
of the member making the request or in gold.
(b) The obligation in (a) above shall not apply
(i) when the convertibility of the balances has been restricted
consistently with Section 2 of this Article, or Article VI,
Section 3 ; or
(ii) when the balances have accumulated as a result of transac-
tions effected before the removal by a member of restrictions
maintained or imposed under Article XIV, Section 2 ; or
(iii) when the balances have been acquired contrary to the ex-
change regulations of the member which is asked to buy
them; or
(iv) when the currency of the member requesting the purchase
has been declared scarce under Article VII, Section 3 (a) ; or
(v) when the member requested to make the purchase is for
any reason not entitled to buy currencies of other members
from the Fund for its own currency.
Section 5. Furnishing oj injormation
(a) The Fund may require members to furnish it with such informa-
tion as it deems necessary for its operations, including, as the minimum
necessary for the effective discharge of the Fund’s duties, national
data on the following matters:
(i) Official holdings at home and abroad, of (1) gold, (2)
foreign exchange.
(ii) Holdings at home and abroad by banking and financial
agencies, other than official agencies, of (1) gold, (2) foreign
exchange.
(iii) Production of gold.
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(iv) Gold exports and imports according to countries of desti-
nation and origin.
(v) Total exports and imports of merchandise, in terms of
local currency values, according to countries of destination
and origin.
(vi) International balance of payments, including (1) trade in
goods and services, (2) gold transactions, (3) known capital
transactions, and (4) other items.
(vii) International investment position, i. e., investments within
the territories of the member owned abroad and invest-
ments abroad owned by persons in its territories so far as
it is possible to furnish this information.
(viii) National income.
(Lx) Price indices, i. e., indices of commodity prices in whole-
sale and retail markets and of export and import prices.
(x) Buying and selling rates for foreign currencies.
(xi) Exchange controls, i. e., a comprehensive statement of
exchange controls in effect at the time of assuming mem-
bership in the Fund and details of subsequent changes as
they occur.
(.xii) Where official clearing arrangements exist, details of
amounts awaiting clearance in respect of commercial and
financial transactions, and of the length of time dining
which such arrears have been outstanding.
(b) In requesting information the Fund shall take into consideration
the varying ability of members to furnish the data requested. Mem-
bers shall be under no obligation to furnish information in such detail
that the affairs of individuals or corporations are disclosed. Members
undertake, however, to furnish the desired information in as detailed
and accurate a manner as is practicable, and, so far as possible, to
avoid mere estimates.
(c) The Fund may arrange to obtain further information by agree-
ment with members. It shall act as a centre for the collection and
exchange of information on monetary and financial problems, thus
facilitating the preparation of studies designed to assist members in
developing policies which further the purposes of the Fund.
Section 6. Consultation between members regarding existing interna-
tional agreements
Where under this Agreement a member is authorized in the special
or temporary circumstances specified in the Agreement to maintain
or establish restrictions on exchange transactions, and there are other
engagements between members entered into prior to this Agreement
which conflict with the application of such restrictions, the parties
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to such engagements will consult with one another with a view to
making such mutually acceptable adjustments as may be necessary.
The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to the opera-
tion of Article VII, Section 5.
Article IX
STATUS, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
Section 1 . Purposes of Article
To enable the Fund to fulfill the functions with which it is entrusted,
the status, immunities and privileges set forth in this Article shall be
accorded to the Fund in the territories of each member.
Section 2. Status of the Fund
The Fund shall possess full juridical personality, and, in particular,
the capacity:
(i) to contract;
(ii) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property;
(iii) to institute legal proceedings.
Section 3. Immunityfrom judicial process
The Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial
process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity
for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.
Section 4. Immunity from other action
Property and assets of the Fund, wherever located and by whom-
soever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation,
expropriation or any other form of seizure by executive or legislative
action.
Section 5. Immunity of archives
The archives of the Fund shall be inviolable.
Section 6. Freedom of assets from restrictions
To the extent necessary to carry out the operations provided for in
this Agreement, all property and assets of the Fund shall be free from
restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoria of any nature.
Section 7. Privilege for communications
The official communications of the Fund shall be accorded by
members the same treatment as the official communications of other
members.
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Section 8. Immunities and privileges of officers and employees
All governors, executive directors, alternates, officers and em-
ployees of the Fund
(i) shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts per-
formed by them in their official capacity except when the
Fund waives this immunity.
(ii) not being local nationals, shall be granted the same immu-
nities from immigration restrictions, alien registration
requirements and national service obligations and the same
facilities as regards exchange restrictions as are accorded by
members to the representatives, officials, and employees of
comparable rank of other members.
(iii) shall be granted the same treatment in respect of travelling
facilities as is accorded by members to representatives,
officials and employees of comparable rank of other members.
Section 9. Immunitiesfrom taxation
(a) The Fund, its assets, property, income and its operations and
transactions authorized by this Agreement, shall be immune from all
taxation and from all customs duties. The Fund shall also be immune
from liability for the collection or payment of any tax or duty.
(b) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emolu-
ments paid by the Fund to executive directors, alternates, officers or
employees of the Fund who are not local citizens, local subjects, or
other local nationals.
(c) No taxation of any kind shall be levied on any obligation or
security issued by the Fund, including any dividend or interest thereon,
by whomsoever held
(i) which discriminates against such obligation or security solely
because of its origin; or
(ii) if the sole jurisdictions! basis for such taxation is the place
or currency in which it is issued, made payable or paid, or
the location of any office or place of business maintained
by the Fund.
Section 10. Application of Article
Each member shall take such action as is necessary in its own
territories for the purpose of making effective in terms of its own law
the principles set forth in this Article and shall inform the Fund of
the detailed action which it has taken.
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Article X
RELATIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The Fund shall cooperate within the terms of this Agreement with
any general international organization and with public international
organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields. Any
arrangements for such cooperation which would involve a modifica-
tion of any provision of this Agreement may be effected only after
amendment to this Agreement under Article XVII.
Article XI
RELATIONS WITH NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
Section 1 . Undertakings regarding relations with non-member countries
Each member undertakes
:
(i) Not to engage in, nor to permit any of its fiscal agencies
referred to in Article V, Section 1, to engage in, any trans-
actions with a non-member or with persons in a non-mem-
ber’s territories which would be contrary to the provisions
of this Agreement or the purposes of the Fund;
(ii) Not to cooperate with a non-member or with persons in a
non-member’s territories in practices which would be con-
trary to the provisions of this Agreement or the purposes
of the Fund; and
(iii) To cooperate with the Fund with a view to the application
in its territories of appropriate measures to prevent trans-
actions with non-members or with persons in their territories
which would be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement
or the purposes of the Fund.
Section 2. Restrictions on transactions with non-member countries
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the right of any member
to impose restrictions on exchange transactions with non-members or
with persons in their territories unless the Fund finds that such
restrictions prejudice the interests of members and are contrary to
the purposes of the Fund.
Article XII
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
Section 1 . Structure oj the Fund
The Fund shall have a Board of Governors, Executive Directors, a
Managing Director and a staff.
FINAL ACT, ANNEX A 45
Section 2. Board of Governors
(a) All powers of the Fund shall be vested in the Board of Gover-
nors, consisting of one governor and one alternate appointed by each
member in such manner as it may determine. Each governor and
each alternate shall serve for five years, subject to the pleasure of the
member appointing him, and may be reappointed. No alternate may
vote except in the absence of his principal. The Board shall select one
of the governors as chairman.
(b) The Board of Governors may delegate to the Executive Di-
rectors authority to exercise any powers of the Board, except the power
to:
(i) Admit new members and determine the conditions of their
admission.
(ii) Approve a revision of quotas.
(iii) Approve a uniform change in the par value of the cur-
rencies of all members.
(iv) Make arrangements to cooperate with other international
organizations (other than informal arrangements of a
temporary or administrative character).
(v) Determine the distribution of the net income of the Fund.
(vi) Require a member to withdraw.
(vii) Decide to liquidate the Fund.
(viii) Decide appeals from interpretations of this Agreement
given by the Executive Directors.
(c) The Board of Governors shall hold an annual meeting and such
other meetings as may be provided for by the Board or called by the
Executive Directors. Meetings of the Board shall be called by the
Directors whenever requested by five members or by members having
one quarter of the total voting power.
(d) A quorum for any meeting of the Board of Governors shall be a
majority of the governors exercising not less than two-thirds of the
total voting power.
(e) Each governor shall be entitled to cast the number of votes
allotted under Section 5 of this Article to the member appointing him.
(f) The Board of Governors may by regulation establish a procedure
whereby the Executive Directors, when they deem such action to be
in the best interests of the Fund, may obtain a vote of the governors
on a specific question without calling a meeting of the Board.
(g) The Board of Governors, and the Executive Directors to the
extent authorized, may adopt such rules and regulations as may be
necessary or appropriate to conduct the business of the Fund.
(h) Governors and alternates shall serve as such without compensa-
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tion from the Fund, but the Fund shall pay them reasonable expenses
incurred in attending meetings.
(i) The Board of Governors shall determine the remuneration to be
paid to the Executive Directors and the salary and terms of the con-
tract of service of the Managing Director.
Section 3. Executive Directors
(a) The Executive Directors shall be responsible for the conduct
of the general operations of the Fund, and for this purpose shall exer-
cise all the powers delegated to them by the Board of Governors.
(b) There shall be not less than twelve directors who need not be
governors, and of whom
(i) Five shall be appointed by the five members having the
largest quotas;
(ii) Not more than two shall be appointed when the provisions of
(c) below apply;
(iii) Five shall be elected by the members not entitled to appoint
directors, other than the American Republics; and
(iv) Two shall be elected by the American Republics not entitled
to appoint directors.
For the purposes of this paragraph, members means governments of
countries whose names are set forth in Schedule A, whether they be-
come members in accordance with Article XX or in accordance with
Article II, Section 2. When governments of other countries become
members, the Board of Governors majq by a four-fifths majority of the
total voting power, increase the number of directors to be elected.
(c) If, at the second regular election of directors and thereafter, the
members entitled to appoint directors under (b) (i) above do not in-
clude the two members, the holdings of whose currencies by the Fund
have been, on the average over the preceding two years, reduced below
their quotas by the largest absolute amounts in terms of gold as a
common denominator, either one or both of such members, as the case
may be, shall be entitled to appoint a director.
(d) Subject to Article XX, Section 3 (b) elections of elective
directors shall be conducted at intervals of two years in accordance
with the provisions of Schedule C, supplemented by such regulations
as the Fund deems appropriate. Whenever the Board of Governors
increases the number of directors to be elected under (b) above, it
shall issue regulations making appropriate changes in the proportion
of votes required to elect directors under the provisions of Schedule C.
(e) Each director shall appoint an alternate with full power to
act for him when he is not present. When the directors appointing
them are present, alternates may participate in meetings but may
not vote.
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(f) Directors shall continue in office until their successors are
appointed or elected. If the office of an elected director becomes
vacant more than ninety days before the end of his term, another
director shall be elected for the remainder of the term by the members
who elected the former director. A majority of the votes cast shall
be required for election. While the office remains vacant, the alter-
nate of the former director shall exercise his powers, except that of
appointing an alternate.
(g) The Executive Directors shall function in continuous session at
the principal office of the Fund and shall meet as often as the business
of the Fund may require.
(h) A quorum for any meeting of the Executive Directors shall
be a majority of the directors representing not less than one-half of
the voting power.
(i) Each appointed director shall be entitled to cast the number
of votes allotted under Section 5 of this Article to the member appoint-
ing him. Each elected director shall be entitled to cast the number
of votes which counted towards his election. When the provisions
of Section 5 (b) of this Article are applicable, the votes which a director
would otherwise be entitled to cast shall be increased or decreased
correspondingly. All the votes which a director is entitled to cast
shall be cast as a unit.
(j) The Board of Governors shall adopt regulations under which
a member not entitled to appoint a director under (b) above may
send a representative to attend any meeting of the Executive Direc-
tors when a request made by, or a matter particularly affecting, that
member is under consideration.
(k) The Executive Directors may appoint such committees as
they deem advisable. Membership of committees need not be limited
to governors or directors or their alternates.
Section 4. Managing Director and staff
(a) The Executive Directors shall select a Managing Director who
shall not be a governor or an executive director. The Managing
Director shall be chairman of the Executive Directors, but shall have
no vote except a deciding vote in case of an equal division. He
may participate in meetings of the Board of Governors, but shall
not vote at such meetings. The Managing Director shall cease to
hold office when the Executive Directors so decide.
(b) The Managing Director shall be chief of the operating staff
of the Fund and shall conduct, under the direction of the Executive
Directors, the ordinary business of the Fund. Subject to the general
control of the Executive Directors, he shall be responsible for the
organization, appointment and dismissal of the staff of the Fund.
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(c) The Managing Director and the staff of the Fund, in the dis-
charge of their functions, shall owe their duty entirely to the Fund
and to no other authority. Each member of the Fund shall respect
the international character of this duty and shall refrain from all
attempts to influence any of the staff in the discharge of his functions.
(d) In appointing the staff the Managing Director shall, subject
to the paramount importance of securing the highest standards of
efficiency and of technical competence, pay due regard to the impor-
tance of recruiting personnel on as wide a geographical basis as possible.
Section 5. Voting
(a) Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one
additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred
thousand United States dollars.
(b) Whenever voting is required under Article V, Section 4 or 5,
each member shall have the number of votes to which it is entitled
under (a) above, adjusted:
(i) by the addition of one vote for the equivalent of each four
hundred thousand United States dollars of net sales of its
currency up to the date when the vote is taken, or
(ii) by the subtraction of one vote for the equivalent of each four
hundred thousand United States dollars of its net purchases
of the currencies of other members up to the date when the
vote is taken
provided, that neither net purchases nor net sales shall be deemed at
any time to exceed an amount equal to the quota of the member
involved.
(c) For the purpose of all computations under this Section, United
States dollars shall be deemed to be of the weight and fineness in
effect on July 1, 1944, adjusted for any uniform change under Article
IV, Section 7, if a waiver is made under Section 8 (d) of that Article.
(d) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all decisions of the
Fund shall be made by a majority of the votes cast.
Section 6. Distribution of net income
(a) The Board of Governors shall determine annually what part
of the Fund’s net income shall be placed to reserve and what part, if
any, shall be distributed.
(b) If any distribution is made, there shall first be distributed a
two percent non-cumulative payment to each member on the amount
by which seventy-five percent of its quota exceeded the Fund’s aver-
age holdings of its currency during that year. The balance shall be
paid to all members in proportion to their quotas. Payments to each
member shall be made in its own currency.
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Section 7. Publication of reports
(a) The Fund shall publish an annual report containing an audited
statement of its accounts, and shall issue, at intervals of three months
or less, a summary statement of its transactions and its holdings of
gold and currencies of members.
(b) The Fund may publish such other reports as it deems desirable
for carrying out its purposes.
Section 8. Communication of views to members
The Fund shall at all times have the right to communicate its
views informally to any member on any matter arising under this
Agreement. The Fund may, by a two-thirds majority of the total
voting power, decide to publish a report made to a member regarding
its monetary or economic conditions and developments which directly
tend to produce a serious disequilibrium in the international balance
of payments of members. If the member is not entitled to appoint
an executive director, it shall be entitled to representation in accord-
ance with Section 3 (j) of this ^Article. The Fund shall not publish
a report involving changes in the fundamental structure of the eco-
nomic organization of members.
Article XIII
OFFICES AND DEPOSITORIES
Section 1 . Location of offices
The principal office of the Fund shall be located in the territory of
the member having, the largest quota, and agencies or branch offices
may be established in the territories of other members.
Section 2. Depositories
(a) Each member country shall designate its central bank as a
depository for all the Fund’s holdings of its currency, or if it has no
central bank it shall designate such other institution as may be
acceptable to the Fund.
(b) The Fund may hold other assets, including gold, in the deposi-
tories designated by the five members having the largest quotas and
in such other designated depositories as the Fund may select. Initially,
at least one-half of the holdings of the Fund shall be held in the
depository designated by the member in whose territories the Fund
has its principal office and at least forty percent shall be held in the
depositories designated by the remaining four members referred to
above. However, all transfers of gold by the Fund shall be made
with due regard to the costs of transport and anticipated require-
ments of the Fund. In an emergency the Executive Directors may
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transfer all or any part of the Fund's gold holdings to any place where
they can be adequately protected.
Section 3. Guarantee oj the Fund's assets
Each member guarantees all assets of the Fund against loss resulting
from failure or default on the part of the depository designated by it.
Article XIV
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD
Section 1 . Introduction
The Fund is not intended to provide facilities for relief or reconstruc-
tion or to deal with international indebtedness arising out of the war.
Section 2. Exchange restrictions
In the post-war transitional period members may, notwithstanding
the provisions of any other articles of this Agreement, maintain and
adapt to changing circumstances (and, in the case of members whose
territories have been occupied by the enemy, introduce where neces-
sary) restrictions on payments and transfers for current international
transactions. Members shall, however, have continuous regard in
their foreign exchange policies to the purposes of the Fund; and, as soon
as conditions permit, they shall take all possible measures to develop
such commercial and financial arrangements with other members as
will facilitate international payments and the maintenance of ex-
change stability. In particular, members shall withdraw restrictions
maintained or imposed under this Section as soon as they are satisfied
that they will be able, in the absence of such restrictions, to settle
their balance of payments in a manner which will not unduly encumber
their access to the resources of the Fund.
Section 3. Notification to the Fund
Each member shall notify the Fund before it becomes eligible under
Article XX, Section 4 (c) or (d), to buy currency from the Fund,
whether it intends to avail itself of the transitional arrangements in
Section 2 of this Article, or whether it is prepared to accept the ob-
ligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4. A member availing
itself of the transitional arrangements shall notify the Fund as soon
thereafter as it is prepared to accept the above-mentioned obligations.
Section 4. Action oj the Fund relating to restrictions
Not later than three years after the date on which the Fund begins
operations and in each year thereafter, the Fund shall report on the
restrictions still in force under Section 2 of this Article. Five years
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after the date on which the Fund begins operations, and in each year
thereafter, any member still retaining any restrictions inconsistent
with Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, or 4, shall consult the Fund as to
their further retention. The Fund may, if it deems such action neces-
sary in exceptional circumstances, make representations to any
member that conditions are favorable for the withdrawal of any
particular restriction, or for the general abandonment of restrictions,
inconsistent with the provisions of any other articles of this Agreement.
The member shall be given a suitable time to reply to such representa-
tions. If the Fund finds that the member persists in maintaining re-
strictions which are inconsistent with the purposes of the Fund, the
member shall be subject to Article XV, Section 2 (a).
Section 5. Nature of transitional period
In its relations with members, the Fund shall recognize that the
post-war transitional period will be one of change and adjustment and
in making decisions on requests occasioned thereby which are pre-
sented by any member it shall give the member the benefit of any
reasonable doubt.
Article XV
WITHDRAWAL FROM MEMBERSHIP
Section 1 . Bight of members to withdraw
Any member may withdraw from the Fund at any time by trans-
mitting a notice in writing to the Fund at its principal office. With-
drawal shall become effective on the date such notice is received.
Section 2. Compulsory withdrawal
(a) If a member fails to fulfill any of its obligations under this
Agreement, the Fund may declare the member ineligible to use the
resources of the Fund. Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to
limit the provisions of Article IV, Section 6, Article V, Section 5, or
Article VI, Section 1.
(b) If, after the expiration of a reasonable period the member
persists in its failure to fulfill any of its obligations under this Agree-
ment, or a difference between a member and the Fund under Article
IV, Section 6, continues, that member may be required to withdraw
from membership in the Fund by a decision of the Board of Governors
carried by a majority of the governors representing a majority of the
total voting power.
(c) Regulations shall be adopted to ensure that before action is
taken against any member under (a) or (b) above, the member shall
be informed in reasonable time of the complaint against it and given
an adequate opportunity for stating its case, both orally and in writing.
52 MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE
Section 3. Settlement oj accounts with members withdrawing
When a member withdraws from the Fund, normal transactions of
the Fund in its currency shall cease and settlement of all accounts
between it and the Fund shall be made with reasonable despatch by
agreement between it and the Fund. If agreement is not reached
promptly, the provisions of Schedule D shall apply to the settlement
of accounts.
Article XVI
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
Section 1 . Temporary suspension
(a) In the event of an emergency or the development of unforeseen
circumstances threatening the operations of the Fund, the Executive
Directors by unanimous vote may suspend for a period of not more
than one hundred twenty days the operation of any of the following
provisions
:
(i) Article IV, Sections 3 and 4(b)
(ii) Article V, Sections 2, 3, 7, 8 (a) and (f)
(iii) Article VI, Section 2
(iv) Article XI, Section 1
(b) Simultaneously with any decision to suspend the operation of
any of the foregoing provisions, the Executive Directors shall call a
meeting of the Board of Governors for the earliest practicable date.
(c) The Executive Directors may not extend any suspension beyond
one hundred twenty days. Such suspension may be extended, how-
ever, for an additional period of not more than two hundred forty
days, if the Board of Governors by a four-fifths majority of the total
voting power so decides, but it may not be further extended except
by amendment of this Agreement pursuant to Article XVII.
(d) The Executive Directors may, by a majority of the total voting
power, terminate such suspension at any time.
Section 2. Liquidation oj the Fund
(a) The Fund may not be liquidated except by decision of the
Board of Governors. In an emergency, if the Executive Directors
decide that liquidation of the Fund may be necessary, they may tem-
porarily suspend all transactions, pending decision by the Board.
(b) If the Board of Governors decides to liquidate the Fund, the
Fund shall forthwith cease to engage in any activities except those
incidental to the orderly collection and liquidation of its assets and
the settlement of its liabilities, and all obligations of members under
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this Agreement shall cease except those set out in this Article, in
Article XVIII, paragraph (c), in Schedule D, paragraph 7, and in
Schedule E.
(c) Liquidation shall be administered in accordance with the
provisions of Schedule E.
Article XVII
AMENDMENTS
(a) Any proposal to introduce modifications in this Agreement,
whether emanating from a member, a governor or the Executive
Directors, shall be communicated to the chairman of the Board of
Governors who shall bring the proposal before the Board. If the
proposed amendment is approved by the Board the Fund shall, by
circular letter or telegram, ask all members whether they accept the
proposed amendment. When three-fifths of the members, having
four-fifths of the total voting power, have accepted the proposed
amendment, the Fund shall certify the fact by a formal communica-
tion addressed to all members.
(b) Notwithstanding (a) above, acceptance by all members is
required in the case of any amendment modifying
(i) the right to withdraw from the Fund (Article XV, Section 1)
;
(ii) the provision that no change in a member’s quota shall be
made without its consent (Article III, Section 2);
(iii) the provision that no change may be made in the par value
of a member’s currency except on the proposal of that
member (Article IV, Section 5 (b)).
(c) Amendments shall enter into force for all members three months
after the date of the formal communication unless a shorter period is
specified in the circular letter or telegram.
Article XVIII
INTERPRETATION
(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agree-
ment arising between any member and the Fund or between any
members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Directors
for their decision. If the question particularly affects any member
not entitled to appoint an executive director it shall be entitled to
representation in accordance with Article XII, Section 3 (j).
(b) In any case where the Executive Directors have given a de-
cision under (a) above, any member may require that the question
be referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be final.
Pending the result of the reference to the Board the Fund may, so
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far as it deems necessary, act on the basis of the decision of the
Executive Directors.
(c) Whenever a disagreement arises between the Fund and a mem-
ber which has withdrawn, or between the Fund and any member
during liquidation of the Fund, such disagreement shall be submitted
to arbitration by a tribunal of three arbitrators, one appointed by the
Fund, another by the member or withdrawing member and an um-
pire who, unless the parties otherwise agree, shall be appointed by
the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice or such
other authority as may have been prescribed by regulation adopted
by the Fund. The umpire shall have full power to settle all questions
of procedure in any case where the parties are in disagreement with
respect thereto.
Article XIX
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
In interpreting the provisions of this Agreement the Fund and its
members shall be guided by the following:
(a) A member’s monetary reserves means its net official holdings
of gold, of convertible currencies of other members, and of the cur-
rencies of such non-members as the Fund may specify.
(b) The official holdings of a member means central holdings (that
is, the holdings of its Treasury, central bank, stabilization fund, or
similar fiscal agency).
(c) The holdings of other official institutions or other banks within
its territories may, in any particular case, be deemed by the Fund,
after consultation with the member, to be official holdings to the extent
that they are substantially in excess of working balances; provided
that for the purpose of determining whether, in a particular case,
holdings are in excess of working balances, there shall be deducted
from such holdings amounts of currency due to official institutions
and banks in the territories of members or non-members specified
under (d) below.
(d) A member’s holdings of convertible currencies means its hold-
ings of the currencies of other members which are not availing them-
selves of the transitional arrangements under Article XIV, Section 2,
together with its holdings of the currencies of such non-members as
the Fund may from time to time specify. The term currency for
this purpose includes without limitation coins, paper money, bank
balances, bank acceptances, and government obligations issued with
a maturity not exceeding twelve months.
(e) A member’s monetary reserves shall be calculated by deducting
from its central holdings the currency liabilities to the Treasuries,
central banks, stabilization funds, or similar fiscal agencies of other
members or non-members specified under (d) above,^together with
FINAL ACT, ANNEX A 55
similar liabilities to other official institutions and other banks in the
territories of members, or non-members specified under (d) above.
To these net holdings shall be added the sums deemed to be official
holdings of other official institutions and other banks under (c)
above.
(f) The Fund’s holdings of the currency of a member shall include
any securities accepted by the Fund under Article III, Section 5.
(g) The Fund, after consultation with a member which is availing
itself of the transitional arrangements under Article XIV, Section 2,
may deem holdings of the currency of that member which carry speci-
fied rights of conversion into another currency or into gold to be
holdings of convertible currency for the purpose of the calculation of
monetary reserves.
(h) For the purpose of calculating gold subscriptions under Article
III, Section 3, a member’s net official holdings of gold and United
States dollars shall consist of its official holdings of gold and United
States currency after deducting central holdings of its currency by
other countries and holdings of its currency by other official institutions
and other banks if these holdings carry specified rights of conversion
into gold or United States currency.
(i) Payments for current transactions means payments which are
not for the purpose of transferring capital, and includes, without
limitation:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other
current business, including services, and normal short-term
banking and credit facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from
other investments;
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or
for depreciation of direct investments;
(4) Moderate remittances for family living expenses.
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned,
determine whether certain specific transactions are to be considered
current transactions or capital transactions.
Article XX
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 1 . Entry into force
This Agreement shall enter into force when it has been signed on
behalf of governments having sixty-five percent of the total of the
quotas set forth in Schedule A and when the instruments referred to
in Section 2 (a) of this Article have been deposited on their behalf,
but in no event shall this Agreement enter into force before May 1,
1945.
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Section 2. Signature
(a) Each government on whose behalf this Agreement is signed
shall deposit with the Government of the United States of America
an instrument setting forth that it has accepted this Agreement in
accordance with its law and has taken all steps necessary to enable
it to carry out all of its obligations under this Agreement.
(b) Each government shall become a member of the Fund as from
the date of the deposit on its behalf of the instrument referred to in
(a) above, except that no government shall become a member before
this Agreement enters into force under Section 1 of this Article.
(c) The Government of the United States of America shall inform
the governments of all countries whose names are set forth in Schedule
A, and all governments whose membership is approved in accordance
with Article II Section 2, of all signatures of this Agreement and of
the deposit of all instruments referred to in (a) above.
(d) At the time this Agreement is signed on its behalf, each govern-
ment shall transmit to the Government of the United States of America
one one-hundredth of one percent of its total subscription in gold or
United States dollars for the purpose of meeting administrative ex-
penses of the Fund. The Government of the United States of America
shall hold such funds in a special deposit account and shall transmit
them to the Board of Governors of the Fund when the initial meeting
has been called under Section 3 of this Article. If this Agreement
has not come into force by December 31, 1945, the Government of
the United States of America shall return such funds to the govern-
ments that transmitted them.
(e) This Agreement shall remain open for signature at Washington
on behalf of the governments of the countries whose names are set
forth in Schedule A until December 31, 1945.
(f) After December 31, 1945, this Agreement shall be open for
signature on behalf of the government- of any country whose member-
ship has been approved in accordance with Article II, Section 2.
(g) By their signature of this Agreement, all governments accept
it both on their own behalf and in respect of all their colonies, over-
seas territories, all territories under their protection, suzerainty, or
authority and all territories in respect of which they exercise a man-
date.
(h) In the case of governments whose metropolitan territories
have been under enemy occupation, the deposit of the instrument
referred to in (a) above may be delayed until one hundred eighty
days after the date on which these territories have been liberated.
If, however, it is not deposited by any such government before the
expiration of this period the signature affixed on behalf of that gov-
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ernment shall become void and the portion of its subscription paid
under (d) above shall be returned to it.
(i) Paragraphs (d) and (h) shall come into force with regard to
each signatory government as from the date of its signature.
Section 3. Inauguration of the Fund
(a) As soon as this Agreement enters into force under Section 1 of
this Article, each member shall appoint a governor and the member
having the largest quota shall call the first meeting of the Board of
Governors.
(b) At the first meeting of the Board of Governors, arrangements
shall be made for the selection of provisional executive directors.
The governments of the five countries for which the largest quotas
are set forth in Schedule A shall appoint provisional executive direc-
tors. If one or more of such governments have not become members,
the executive directorships they would be entitled to fill shall remain
vacant until they become members, or until January 1, 1946, which-
ever is the earlier. Seven provisional executive directors shall be
elected in accordance with the provisions of Schedule C and shall
remain in office until the date of the first regular election of executive
directors which shall be held as soon as practicable after January 1,
1946.
(c) The Board of Governors may delegate to the provisional exec-
utive directors any powers except those which may not be delegated
to the Executive Directors.
Section 4. Initial determination of par values
(a) When the Fund is of the opinion that it will shortly be in a
position to begin exchange transactions, it shall so notify the members
and shall request each member to communicate within thirty days the
par value of its currency based on the rates of exchange prevailing on
the sixtieth day before the entry into force of this Agreement. No
member whose metropolitan territory has been occupied by the enemy
shall be required to make such a communication while that territory
is a theater of major hostilities or for such period thereafter as the
Fund may determine. When such a member communicates the par
value of its currency the provisions of (d) below shall apply.
(b) The par value communicated by a member whose metropolitan
territory has not been occupied by the enemy shall be the par value
of that member’s currency for the purposes of this Agreement unless,
within ninety days after the request referred to in (a) above has been
received, (i) the member notifies the Fund that it regards the par
value as unsatisfactory, or (ii) the Fund notifies the member that in
its opinion the par value cannot be maintained without causing re-
course to the Fund on the part of that member or others on a scale
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prejudicial to the Fund and to members. When notification is given
under (i) or (ii) above, the Fund and the member shall, within a
period determined by the Fund in the light of all relevant circum-
stances, agree upon a suitable par value for that currency. If the
Fund and' the member do not agree within the period so determined,
the member shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the Fund on the
date when the period expires.
(c) WFen the par value of a member’s currency has been estab-
lished under (b) above, either by the expiration of ninety days with-
out notification, or by agreement after notification, the member shall
be eligible to buy from the Fund the currencies of other members to
the full extent permitted in this Agreement, provided that the Fund
has begun exchange transactions.
(d) In the case of a member whose metropolitan territory has been
occupied by the enemy, the provisions of (b) above shall apply,
subject to the following modifications:
(i) The period of ninety days shall be extended so as to end on
a date to be fixed by agreement between the Fund and the
member.
(ii) Within the extended period the member may, if the Fund
has begun exchange transactions, buy from the Fund with
its currency the currencies of other members, but only under
such conditions and in such amounts as may be prescribed
by the Fund.
(iii) At any time before the date fixed under (i) above, changes
may be made by agreement with the Fund in the par value
communicated under (a) above.
(e) If a member whose metropolitan territory has been occupied
by the enemy adopts a new monetary unit before the date to be fixed
under (d) (i) above, the par value fixed by that member for the new
unit shall be communicated to the Fund and the provisions of (d)
above shall apply.
(f) Changes in par values agreed with the Fund under this Sec-
tion shall not be taken into account in determining whether a proposed
change falls within (i), (ii), or (iii) of Article IV, Section 5 (c).
(g) A member communicating to the Fund a par value for the cur-
rency of its metropolitan territory shall simultaneously communicate
a value, in terms of that currency, for each separate currency, where
such exists, in the territories in respect of which it has accepted this
Agreement under Section 2 (g) of this Article, but no member shall be
required to make a communication for the separate currency of a
territory which has been occupied by the enemy while that territory
is a theater of major hostilities or for such period thereafter as the
Fund may determine. On the basis of the par value so communicated,
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the Fund shall compute the par value of each separate currency. A
communication or notification to the Fund under (a), (b) or (d) above
regarding the par value of a currency, shall also be deemed, unless the
contrary is stated, to be a communication or notification regarding the
par value of all the separate currencies referred to above. Any mem-
ber may, however, make a communication or notification relating to
the metropolitan or any of the separate currencies alone. If the
member does so, the provisions of the preceding paragraphs (includ-
ing (d) above, if a territory where a separate currency exists has been
occupied by the enemy) shall apply to each of these currencies
separately.
(h) The Fund shall begin exchange transactions at such date as it
may determine after members having sixty-five percent of the total
of the quotas set forth in Schedule A have become eligible, in accord-
ance with the preceding paragraphs of this Section, to purchase the
currencies of other members, but in no event until after major hos-
tilities in Europe have ceased.
(i) The Fund may postpone exchange transactions with any
member if its circumstances are such that, in the opinion of the Fund,
they would lead to use of the resources of the Fund in a manner con-
trary to the purposes of this Agreement or prejudicial to the Fund
or the members.
(j) The par values of the currencies of governments which indicate
their desire to become members after December 31, 1945, shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of Article II, Section 2.
Done at Washington, in a single copy which shall remain deposited
in the archives of the Government of the United States of America,
which' shall transmit certified copies to all governments whose names
are set forth in Schedule A and to all governments whose membership
is approved in accordance with Article II, Section 2.
SCHEDULE A
Quotas
(In millions of United
States dollars)
Australia 200
Belgium 225
Bolivia 10
Brazil 150
Canada 300
Chile 50
China 550
Colombia 50
Costa Rica 5
Cuba 50
Czechoslovakia 125
Denmark* *
Dominican Republic 5
Ecuador 5
Egypt 45
El Salvador 2.
Ethiopia 6
France 450
Greece 40
Guatemala 5
Haiti 5
Honduras 2.
Iceland 1
(In millions of United
States dollars)
India 400
Iran 25
Iraq 8
Liberia
. 5
Luxembourg 10
Mexico 90
Netherlands 275
New Zealand 50
Nicaragua 2
Norway 50
Panama
. 5
Paraguay 2
Peru 25
Philippine Commonwealth 15
Poland 125
Union of South Africa 100
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics 1200
United Kingdom 1300
United States 2750
Uruguay 15
Venezuela 15
Yugoslavia 60
•The quota of Denmark shall be determined by the Fund after the Danish Government has* declared
its readiness to sign this Agreement but before signature takes place.
SCHEDULE B
Provisions With Respect to Repurchase by a Member of Its
Currency Held by the Fund
1. In determining the extent to which repurchase of a member’s
currency from the Fund under Article V, Section 7 (b) shall be made
with each type of monetary reserve, that is, with gold and with each
convertible currency, the following rule, subject to 2 below, shall
apply:
(a) If the member’s monetary reserves have not increased during
the year, the amount payable to the Fund shall be distributed
among all types of reserves in proportion to the member’s
holdings thereof at the end of the year.
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(b) If the member’s monetary reserves have increased during the
year, a part of the amount payable to the Fund equal to
one-lmlf of the increase shall be distributed among those types
of reserves which have increased in proportion to the amount
by which each of them has increased. The remainder of the
sum payable to the Fund shall be distributed among all
types of reserves in proportion to the member’s remaining
holdings thereof.
(c) If after all the repurchases required under Article V, Section
7 (b), had been made, the result would exceed any of the
limits specified in Article V, Section 7 (c), the Fund shall
require such repurchases to be made by the members pro-
portionate^ in such manner that the limits will not be
exceeded.
2. The Fund shall not acquire the currency of any non-member
under Article V, Section 7 (b) and (c).
3. In calculating monetary reserves and the increase in monetary
reserves during any year for the purpose of Article V, Section 7 (b)
and (c), no account shall be taken, unless deductions have otherwise
been made by the member for such holdings, of any increase in those
monetary reserves which is due to currency previously inconvertible
having become convertible during the year; or to holdings which are
the proceeds of a long-term or medium-term loan contracted during
the year; or to holdings which have been transferred or set aside for
repayment of a loan during the subsequent year.
4. In the case of members whose metropolitan territories have been
occupied by the enemy, gold newly produced during the five years
after the entry into force of this Agreement from mines located within
their metropolitan territories shall not be included in computations
of their monetary reserves or of increases in their monetary reserves.
SCHEDULE C
Election of Executive Directors
1. The election of the elective executive directors shall be by ballot
of the governors eligible to vote under Article XII, Section 3 (b) (iii)
and (iv).
2. In balloting for the five directors to be elected under Article XII,
Section 3 (b) (iii), each of the governors eligible to vote shall cast for
one person all of the votes to which he is entitled under Article XII,
Section 5 (a) . The five persons receiving the greatest number of votes
shall be directors, provided that no person who received less than
nineteen percent of the total number of votes that can be cast (eligible
votes) shall be considered elected.
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3. When five persons are not elected in the first ballot, a second
ballot shall be held in which the person who received the lowest number
of votes shall be ineligible for election and in which there shall vote
only (a) those governors who voted in the first ballot for a person not
elected, and (b) those governors whose votes for a person elected are
deemed under 4 below to have raised the votes cast for that person
above twenty percent of the eligible votes.
4. In determining whether the votes cast by a governor are to be
deemed to have raised the total of any person above twenty percent
of the eligible votes the twenty percent shall be deemed to include,
first, the votes of the governor casting the largest number of votes for
such person, then the votes of the governor casting the next largest
number, and so on until twenty percent is reached.
5. Any governor part of whose votes must be counted in order to
raise the total of any person above nineteen percent shall be considered
as casting all of his votes for such person even if the total votes for
such person thereby exceed twenty percent.
6. If, after the second ballot, five persons have not been elected,
further ballots shall be held on the same principles until five persons
have been elected, provided that after four persons are elected, the fifth
may be elected by a simple majority of the remaining votes and shall be
deemed to have been elected by all such votes.
7. The directors to be elected by the American Republics under
Article XII, Section 3 (b) (iv) shall be elected as follows:
(a) Each of the directors shall be elected separately.
(b) In the election of the first director, each governor representing
an American Republic eligible to participate in the election
shall cast for one person all the votes to which he is entitled.
The person receiving the largest number of votes shall be
elected provided that he has received not lass than forty-five
percent of the total votes.
(c) If no person is elected on the first ballot, further ballots shall
be held, in each of which the person receiving the lowest
number of votes shall be eliminated, until one person receives
a number of votes sufficient for election under (b) above.
(d) Governors whose votes contributed to the election of the
first director shall take no part in the election of the second
director.
(e) Persons who did not succeed in the first election shall not be
ineligible for election as the second director.
(f) A majority of the votes which can be cast shall be required
for election of the second director. If at the first ballot no
person receives a majority, further ballots shall be held in
each of which the person receiving the lowest number of
votes shall be eliminated, until some person obtains a majority.
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(g) The second director shall be deemed to have been elected by
all the votes which could have been cast in the ballot securing
his election.
SCHEDULE D
Settlement of Accounts With Members Withdrawing
1. The Fund shall be obligated to pay to a member withdrawing
an amount equal to its quota, plus any other amounts due to it from
the Fund, less any amounts due to the Fund, including charges
accruing after the date of its withdrawal; but no payment shall be
made until six months after the date of withdrawal. Payments shall
be made in the currency of the withdrawing member.
2. If the Fund’s holdings of the currency of the withdrawing mem-
ber are not sufficient to pay the net amount due from the Fund, the
balance shall be paid in gold, or in such other manner as may be
agreed. If the Fund and the withdrawing member do not reach
agreement within six months of the date of withdrawal, the currency
in question held by the Fund shall be paid forthwith to the with-
drawing member. Any balance due shall be paid in ten half-yearly
installments during the. ensuing five years. Each such installment
shall be paid, at the option of the Fund, either in the currency of the
withdrawing member acquired after its withdrawal or by the delivery
of gold.
3. If the Fund fails to meet any installment which is due in accord-
ance with the preceding paragraphs, the withdrawing member shall
be entitled to require the Fund to pay the installment in any currency
held by the Fund with the exception of any currency which has been
declared scarce under Article VII, Section 3.
4. If the Fund’s holdings of the currency of a withdrawing member
exceed the amount due to it, and if agreement on the method of
settling accounts is not reached within six months of the date of
withdrawal, the former member shall be obligated to redeem such
excess currency in gold or, at its option, in the currencies of members
which at the time of redemption are convertible. Redemption shall
be made at the parity existing at the time of withdrawal from the
Fund. The;withdrawing member shall complete redemption within
five years of ithe date of withdrawal, or’ within such longer period as
may be fixed by the Fund, but shall not be required to redeem in any
half-yearly period more than one-tentli of the Fund’s excess holdings
of its currency at the date of withdrawal plus further acquisitions
of the currency during such half-yearly period. If the withdrawing
member does not fulfill this obligation, the Fund may in an orderly
manner liquidate in any market the amount of currency which should
have been redeemed.
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5. Any member desiring to obtain the currency of a member which
has withdrawn shall acquire it by purchase from the Fund, to the
extent that such member has access to the resources of the Fund
and that such currency is available under 4 above.
6. The withdrawing member guarantees the unrestricted use at
all times of the currency disposed of under 4 and 5 above for the
purchase of goods or for payment of sums due to it or to persons
within its territories. It shall compensate the Fund for any loss
resulting from the difference between the par value of its currency on
the date of withdrawal and the value realized by the Fund on disposal
under 4 and 5 above.
7. In the event of the Fund going into liquidation under Article
XVI, Section 2, within six months of the date on which the member
withdraws, the account between the Fund and that government shall
be settled in accordance with Article XVI, Section 2, and Schedule E.
SCHEDULE E
Administration of Liquidation
1. In the event of liquidation the liabilities of the Fund other than
the repayment of subscriptions shall have priority in the distribution
of the assets of the Fund. In meeting each such liability the Fund
shall use its assets in the following order:
(a) the currency in which the liability is payable;
(b) gold;
(c) all other currencies in proportion, so far as may be practicable,
to the quotas of the members.
2. After the discharge of the Fund’s liabilities in accordance with 1
above, the balance of the Fund’s assets shall be distributed and
apportioned as follows:
(a) The Fund shall distribute its holdings of gold among the
members whose currencies are held by the Fund in amounts
less than their quotas. These members shall share the gold
so distributed in the proportions of the amounts by which -
their quotas exceed the Fund’s holdings of their currencies.
(b) The Fund shall distribute to each member one-half the
Fund’s holdings of its currency but such distribution shall
not exceed fifty percent of its quota.
(c) The Fund shall apportion the remainder of its holdings of
each currency among all the members in proportion to the
amounts due to each member after the distributions under
(a) and (b) above.
3. Each member shall redeem the holdings of its currency appor-
tioned to other members under 2 (c) above, and shall agree with the
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Fund within three months after a decision to liquidate upon an
orderly procedure for such redemption.
4. If a member has not reached agreement with the Fund within
the three-month period referred to in 3 above, the Fund shall use the
currencies of other members apportioned to that member under 2 (c)
above to redeem the currency of that member apportioned to other
members. Each currency apportioned to a member which has not
reached agreement shall be used, so far as possible, to redeem its
currency apportioned to the members which have made agreements
with the Fund under 3 above.
5. If a member has reached agreement with the Fund in accordance
with 3 above, the Fund shall use the currencies of other members
apportioned to that member under 2 (c) above to redeem the currency
of that member apportioned to other members which have made
agreements with the Fund under 3 above. Each amount so redeemed
shall be redeemed in the currency of the member to which it was
apportioned.
6. After carrying out the preceding paragraphs, the Fund shall pay
to each member the remaining currencies held for its account.
7. Each member whose currency has been distributed to other
members under 6 above shall redeem such currency in gold or, at its
option, in the currency of the member requesting redemption, or in
such other manner as may be agreed between them. If the members
involved do not otherwise agree, the member obligated to redeem
shall complete redemption within five years of the date of distribution,
but shall not be required to redeem in any half-yearly period more than
one-tenth of the amount distributed to each other member. If the
member does not fulfill this obligation, the amount of currency which
should have been redeemed may be liquidated in an orderly manner
in any market.
8. Each member whose currency has been distributed to other
members under 6 above guarantees the unrestricted use of such
currency at all times for the purchase of goods or for payment of sums
due to it or to persons in its territories. Each member so obligated
agrees to compensate other members for any loss resulting from the
difference between the par value of its currency on the date of the
decision to liquidate the Fund and the value realized by such members
on disposal of its currency.
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